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ABSTRACT 
Since 1957, space has been a significant domain of great power competition, 
generating soft power and providing pronounced military benefits. As the United States 
enters an era of renewed great power competition with peer adversaries, the U.S. Navy, 
operating as a forward presence, faces increased challenges from Russia and China. This 
thesis investigates possible allied space coalition structures and how space cooperation 
can be leveraged as a force multiplier to enhance naval operations. Two case studies are 
featured as a means of evaluating current U.S. allies, their space capabilities, policies, and 
histories. Germany, France, and the UK are examined in the context of challenges from 
Russia in the Mediterranean and Arctic, and Japan, Australia, and South Korea are 
considered relative to the operational challenges in the South China Sea and a Taiwan 
contingency resulting from the rise of China. The military space programs of Europe are 
found to be much more developed and interconnected than the more nascent Indo-Pacific 
military space programs, which remain separated as a result of historical tensions and 
Cold War–era bilateral cooperation structures. Ultimately, this thesis determines that 
a U.S.-led space coalition should break from past bilateral or regional alliance structures 
in favor of a global space coalition to best leverage the benefits of burden 
sharing, deterrence, mission assurance, and increased capacity to support global 
maritime operations.
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In an era of renewed great power competition, the United States is moving away 
from the global war on terror and facing near peer competition with China and Russia. It 
is under this context that we need to evaluate the role of space. How can our traditional 
alliances and networks be strengthened through allied space cooperation to meet the 
challenges of the day?  Can space alliances be used as a force multiplier?  
This thesis tackles the central question: What is the most effective way to structure 
a space coalition with existing allies to best enhance naval operations? American space 
strategy exhibited a major shift toward cooperation in 2010 with President Obama’s release 
of his new National Space Policy.1 Cooperation and interoperability with allies in space 
was reinforced in 2011 with the release of the National Security Space Policy, affirming 
the fundamental nature of space capabilities to U.S. national security.2 Allied space 
cooperation has an extremely broad application to intelligence agencies, and across the 
military at large. That challenge, however, is beyond the scope of this work. This thesis 
attempts a more modest task of proposing key elements for building an allied space 
network with the intent to enhance the effectiveness of naval operations. The 2018 Design 
for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 2.0 calls for extended networks of allies and regional 
partners to leverage capabilities and strengthen global maritime awareness.3 At the time of 
this writing, the Tri-Service Maritime Strategy has been recently released, to address the 
threat from China and Russia. It maintains the need for “unity of effort” with allies, which 
 
1 White House, National Space Policy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White 
House, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf. 
2 Department of Defense and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Security Space 
Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2011), 6, 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/
2011_nationalsecurityspacestrategy.pdf. 
3 Chief of Naval Operations, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 2.0 (Washington, DC: 
Chief of Naval Operations, 2018), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5633091-A-Design-for-
Maintaining-Maritime-Superiority.html. 
2 
generates power to “modify behavior in the maritime domain.”4 In this framework, space 
cooperation can be viewed as any coordinated effort between allies to share costs, 
equipment, operations, or information pertaining to space systems or derived from them.  
Ultimately, this thesis explores allied space cooperation in two critical regions, 
Europe and the Indo-Pacific, evaluating possible integration with naval partners. How 
could high-end interoperability through an allied space network enhance the Navy’s 
strategic efforts and help achieve regional security? Within this analysis, the current U.S. 
alliance structure and possible impacts of enhanced cooperation on naval operations are 
evaluated. The choice to focus on Europe and the Indo-Pacific regions is made to view the 
role of space cooperation and coalitions through the lens of renewed great power 
competition with Russia and China.  
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
In 1957, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) launched Sputnik 1, the 
first artificial satellite, into low earth orbit (LEO), prompting the United States to follow 
suit, launching Explorer 1 in 1958. This began what would become a dramatic space race 
and an era of increasingly advanced space and satellite technology, both civil and military. 
The question of how to engage with space has long been tied to the notion of national 
security and defending military, political and economic interests. Access to space also 
grants countries a kind of soft power derived from international prestige, as well as 
technological benefits. It is no great leap connecting space to international geopolitical 
competition. Indeed, since 1957, competition in one form or another has driven the space 
race.  
From the days of the Cold War space race to the modern era, space has always been 
intricately tied to the political tensions of the day. Emerging in the 2017 National Security 
Strategy, strategic thinking in America has now shifted to that of an era of renewed great 
 
4 Department of the Navy, United States Coast Guard, and United States Marine Corps, Advantage at 




power competition.5 Seeking to expand its influence and reemerge as a great power, the 
Russian Federation, through its military and political actions, has undermined international 
norms and violated agreements, including: the UN Charter, Helsinki Accords, Russia-
NATO Founding Act, Budapest Memorandum, and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
Treaty— thereby destabilizing regional security.6 The United States and its NATO allies 
and partners throughout Europe are challenged with the strategic implications of these 
expanded military operations and efforts to upset the established world order.  
Similarly, in the east, China, a once agrarian empire, has emerged as an industrial 
and economic power seeking to exert its influence beyond its borders. China’s emergence 
as a great power threatens to unhinge the current world order, as it fails to comply with 
established international law. A prominent maritime nation in the Indo-Pacific, China had 
ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on 7 June 1996, 
as one of the 168 signatories. The U.S. Naval War College Stockton Center for 
International Law identified in a 2021 report, however, that China had immediately broken 
from the Convention starting in 1996.7 It declared excessive maritime baselines, 
unlawfully claiming all territory within the historic Nine-Dash Line (9DL), promoted 
illegal requirements for Innocent Passage, and violated the privileges afforded by exclusive 
economic zones (EEZ), both domestically and within the waters of regional neighbors.8 In 
2016, the Hague Tribunal, unanimously found China to be in violation of UNCLOS.9 
Despite the tribunal and international outcry, China has maintained its course, continuing 
to upset the international rules-based order and the geopolitical system through its 
economic policies and maritime actions. 
 
5 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White 
House, 2017), 25, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=806478. 
6 Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015), 2, https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA619156. 
7 Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, “China’s Excessive Maritime Claims,” International Law 
Studies 97, no. 1 (January 2, 2021): 19–23, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=2941&context=ils. 
8 Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 19–23. 
9 Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, 23. 
4 
The U.S. Navy has long been integral to U.S. foreign policy, working hand-in-hand 
with the Department of State, as the “forward presence service” used to advance national 
interests abroad.10 Summarily, in an era of renewed great power competition, the Navy 
finds itself central to efforts at diplomacy and deterrence in the face of these rising 
revisionist powers. Given the undeniable importance of space, and its role in national 
security will be integral to the challenges the U.S. Navy faces in Europe and the Indo-
Pacific. The use of counterspace capabilities is written into both Chinese and Russian 
doctrine, to reduce U.S., allied, and partner military effectiveness, as well as to deter and 
counter intervention in regional military conflict.11 For the U.S. Navy to maintain its 
effectiveness at sea as a strategic force, the continuity and resilience of space-based assets 
is essential. Norman Freedman writes in Seapower and Space: “The surface ships are 
effective because they have access to space resources, particularly to the fruits of national 
sensors.”12 Furthermore, he posits that “information gathered by multiple remote sensors, 
fused and overlaid, and distributed reliably by satellite is the key to future victory at sea.”13 
Without an effective allied space network to build resiliency and continuity of access, the 
United States runs the risk of removing the Navy from the fight. Having a well-structured 
allied space network and securing our access to space-based capabilities may be essential 
to great power competition in the coming decades. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Strategic thinking in the United States underwent a major shift in 2010, at least as 
far as space and international security was concerned. Emerging from a much more 
unilateral and aggressive era of space policy rooted in the ideals of the Cold War, the 2010 
National Space Policy released by President Obama set forth the conditions for an entirely 
 
10 Michael W. Coulter, “State and Navy: Partnership in Diplomacy,” Proceedings 133, no. 7 (July 10, 
2007): 44–48. 
11 Department of Defense, Defense Space Strategy Summary (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2020), 3, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/17/2002317391/-1/-1/
1/2020_DEFENSE_SPACE_STRATEGY_SUMMARY.PDF. 
12 Norman Friedman, Seapower and Space: From the Dawn of the Missile Age to Net-Centric Warfare 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 303. 
13 Friedman, 311. 
5 
different view on international space relations.14 This document emphasized cooperative 
measures rather the space nationalist view of the Bush administration’s 2006 National 
Space Policy, which emphasized the need for “freedom of action in space.”15 The Obama 
administration in 2011 released the first National Security Space Strategy. It emphasized 
that “The United States will lead in building coalitions of like-minded space-faring 
nations” and “we will explore the development of combined space doctrine … and enable 
the collaborative sharing of space capabilities in crisis and conflict.”16 These two 
documents released within a year of each other shifted the focus of American strategic 
thinking down the path of allied space cooperation. 
The Trump administration was slow to release its National Space Policy. In 
December 2020, one month before leaving office, a detailed policy for American space 
interests was released. Specific to allied cooperation, the plan encouraged the Department 
of Defense to “Augment United States capabilities by leveraging existing and planned 
space capabilities of allies and partners.”17 This vision was in line with the previous 
administration and allowed for continuity of effort in U.S. strategic efforts at engaging 
allies in space. 
The Defense Department has built on the broader space strategy and specified its 
own priorities for the department. In 2017 the Department of Defense International Space 
Cooperation Strategy (ISCS) was enacted citing “international cooperation as a central 
element of the larger U.S. space strategy.”18  The stated purpose of the ISCS was an 
approach to leverage the capabilities of U.S. allies and partners to expand “interoperability, 
 
14 White House, National Space Policy of the United States of America, 2010. 
15 James Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National 
Interests, Third Edition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019), 300, http://www.sup.org/books/
title/?id=31357. 
16 Department of Defense and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Security Space 
Strategy of the United States of America, 9. 
17 White House, National Space Policy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White 
House, 2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/12/16/2020-27892/the-national-space-
policy. 
18 Department of Defense, DOD International Space Cooperation Strategy (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2017), 1, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=805231. 
6 
sustainability, mission assurance, and assured access to critical capabilities in crisis and 
contingency operations.”19 The DOD, in June 2020, expounded upon its policy in the 
Defense Space Strategy, noting the international growth in space activities, particularly 
among our allies, and identifying these developments as “novel opportunities to increase 
defense collaboration and cooperation.”20 This document is the first to directly make the 
connection between allied space cooperation and the return to great power competition 
with Russia and China. Naval strategic thinking has long been in favor of allied and joint 
operations. However, it was not until the newly released Tri-Service Maritime Strategy, 
Advantage at Sea, that the Navy began addressing how to leverage allied and partner space 
capabilities to be used as a force multiplier, while emphasizing allied networks to “uphold 
global maritime security.”21 
In the academic literature, there is a relative consensus that the newly emerged 
concept of allied space networks is beneficial for space security. However there remains 
no generally agreed upon idea of how an allied space network should be structured or where 
the priorities should lie when considering obstacles to advancement of cooperative efforts. 
The dominant view observed in the literature is one of global networks. Although, many 
of the writings on the subject do not expressly emphasize this structure, their uninhibited 
use of the phrasing “allies” and discussion of the basis of what these systems should look 
like lends itself toward a global system of allied cooperation.  
James Clay Moltz was one of the earliest voices supporting allied space networks, 
advocating for a globally structured, U.S.-led system. Writing in 2011, he stated “an allied 
approach to space may represent the best short-term route to enhanced U.S. and allied space 
security, while potentially offering benefits to the global community of space users as 
well.”22 Building on Moltz’s work, Capt. (Ret) Alan Scott, in a paper supplementing a 
 
19 Department of Defense, 1–2. 
20 Department of Defense, Defense Space Strategy Summary, 1. 
21 Department of the Navy, United States Coast Guard, and United States Marine Corps, Advantage at 
Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power, 13. 
22 James Clay Moltz, “Coalitions in Space: Where Networks Are Power,” Space and Defense, Vol. 5, 
no. 1 (Summer 2011): 7. 
7 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency study, endeavored to provide the basis of a framework 
for how these architectures could be structured, addressing cooperation in Space 
Situational Awareness (SSA) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
collaboration. He proposed that the U.S. leverage capabilities of the European Space 
Agency (ESA) and Japan, even going so far as suggest one day possible integration with a 
then-more-friendly Russia. Scott surmised that despite the clear benefits for further 
international cooperation in space, there are major hurdles that need to be addressed, such 
as classification issues limiting data sharing and the interoperability of dissemination 
systems.23 
The Aerospace Corporation, Center for Space Policy and Strategy conducted a 
study in 2020 on defense space partnerships. They found many of the same hurdles raised 
by Scott, acknowledging the more technical difficulties and furthermore addressing 
specific organizational challenges. Their report authored by Robert S. Wilson, Colleen 
Stover, and Steven R. Jordan Tomaszewski argues that navigating the “myriad of 
organizations” for defense space partnerships is a challenge for allies.24 Additionally, 
where the United States has made progress toward cooperative efforts in space, it has failed 
to fully leverage allied capabilities. They make the point that these partnerships themselves 
are the goal, proposing that an allied space network should be viewed not as a “transactional 
benefit but as a strategic objective itself.”25 In the Handbook of Space Security, Jana 
Robinson writes on the importance of allies for space security and bringing together the 
space security communities of Europe and Japan. To address the issue, she conducted case 
studies of U.S. cooperation with Europe and Japan, describing current allied space 
 
23 Alan D. Scott, Coalition Building in Space: Initial Technical Considerations and Potential 
Implementation Strategies, OSRD 2011 023 (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=716210. 
24 Robert S. Wilson, Colleen Stover, and Steven R. Jordan Tomaszewski, Defense Space 
Partnerships: A Strategic Priority (El Segundo, CA: Aerospace Corporation, Center for Space Policy and 
Strategy, 2020), 5, https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/
Wilson_DefensePartnerships_20200916.pdf. 
25 Wilson, Stover, and Jordan Tomaszewski, 7. 
8 
cooperation as still “in a relatively nascent stage.”26 Robinson argues that the most 
successful allied space structure will be one “where mutually reinforcing collaboration 
exceeds the benefits of competition.”27 
In his journal article for the February 2021 edition of Space Policy, Gentoku 
Toyoma, presents a different perspective on space cooperation. He proposes three new 
conceptual obstacles to a global coalition: the culture of secrecy, the pace of development, 
and concerns of entrapment. The pace of development, specifically, he cites should favor 
“unilateral efforts due to the lengthy negotiations and coordination issues” required for a 
global alliance structure.28 However, he ultimately concludes that the United States should 
cooperate in space security and that, is “inherently global in nature,” which will help 
“realize the U.S. goals of resilience and reconstitution.”29 
Finally, an NPS graduate thesis in 2018 directly tackled the question of how the 
United States can benefit from coalition operations in space. While applicable to question 
of allied coalitions overall, it should be noted that his work was not specifically addressing 
naval operations. Maj. Robert H. Manuel conducted a case study analysis of three of the 
United States closest allies: Australia, France, and Japan. He detailed the DOD’s history of 
collaboration, and any political or cultural concerns that have arisen to strain or streamline 
these interactions. His work found that despite some success in military space cooperation, 
the United States and DOD must continue the work toward collaboration to gain “an 
asymmetric military advantage over its near-peer competitors, Russia and China, for whom 
such collaboration appears highly unlikely.”30 
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In literature approaching allied space cooperation from a perspective other than a 
global coalition structure, there are two distinct works produced by Scott Pace and the 
combined work of Pablo Alonso-García and Benjamin Silverstein. Pace, like Robinson in 
the Handbook of Space Security, addresses space cooperation with Japan. Where Robinson 
argues that the U.S. should coordinate efforts with Europe and Japan, Pace first takes a 
bilateral and then more regional approach, stating: “Japan should be the partner of choice 
for space cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region due to its relationship with the United 
States and its capabilities.”31 Pace appears to suggest that space cooperation would begin 
with Japan but emerge as a regional security effort amongst other allies of the United States. 
Resource pressures would drive cooperation such as “multilateral actions to coordinate and 
share costs will be necessary.”32 In the European theater, Alonso-García and Silverstein 
wrote a chapter in a report examining how the newly proposed European Union (EU) Space 
Agency and NATO could enhance European space security. Within this context, they have 
proposed an avenue of engagement for the United States to create a transatlantic space 
cooperation structure providing mutual security benefits.33 These two writings are 
presented to show that there is not a total consensus in the literature that a global space 
architecture is the structure of choice. 
Moltz’s 2011 literature review of the leading studies of space security determined 
“that there has been inadequate attention paid to the prospects of truly allied strategies to 
accomplish shared goals of space threat reduction, deterrence, and defense.”34 Despite 
progress being made, the academic study of this topic remains insufficiently realized to 
wholly refute this claim. In the eleven years since the shift in American strategic thinking, 
there has not been the thorough investigation that is needed or development of an outlined 
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plan for how to integrate and structure an allied space network, particularly regarding Navy 
relevant issues or missions.  
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Throughout history, nations have used alliances to garner international support, 
resist enemies, or broaden their pool of resources. Space should be no different. For the 
U.S. Navy to most effectively leverage the opportunity afforded by space, it must have an 
effective space network to rely upon. The question of how best to establish these alliances 
in space is a complex one. Military cooperation, as stated, is not new, but the idea of 
cooperating in space is a relatively new concept, emerging from an era of nationalistic Cold 
War thinking. In understanding how to structure these new alliances and leverage past 
cooperation, it is critical to understand how the United States has interacted with its allies 
in the European and Indo-Pacific theaters.  
There are three methods for structuring a space coalition, of which, two examples 
are seen currently enacted in long-standing alliances of the United States. The least 
complex and easiest to initiate is a simple bilateral agreement. The United States would 
integrate one-on-one with a partner nation, reaching an agreement to share data, financial 
burdens, and other resources as agreed upon. The Georgetown Journal of International 
Affairs released an article, “U.S. Trans-Pacific and Trans-Atlantic Alliances: A 
Comparison,” assessing the state of U.S. military alliances in Asia and Europe.35 In the 
article, Tongfi Kim, determines that U.S. security alliances in Asia have been bilateral in 
nature, whereas in Europe the alliances have been much larger multilateral endeavors, 
specifically citing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the prime example. 
Naturally, the second possible structure for a space coalition would follow Kim’s example 
of NATO. An allied space coalition could be a regional affair, as is seen predominately 
throughout Europe, rather than the bilateral efforts in Asia. Finally, this leaves the last 
possible structure for space cooperation. A global coalition of United States allies expanded 
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into the space domain is a potential structure for the United States to face the challenges of 
great power competition. 
In examining these three coalition structures, it is expected that there will be 
impediments to cooperation, and, alternatively, there may be more favorable conditions 
that vary between the two regions. Political differences between allied nations in a space 
coalition would present a challenge. Established organizations such as the European Union 
or the European Space Agency (ESA) present institutional obstacles toward an allied 
network. Similarly, differences in experience level of military space programs could 
generate a point of friction. This friction was seen in the mid-1960s during the faltering 
development of the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO), where 
German space efforts were seen to be lacking in comparison to the robust national space 
program and experience of the French and British.36 This is by no means meant to be a 
comprehensive list. The intention is to acknowledge the variety of factors and conditions 
that warrant addressing. They present some of the potential impediments and conducive 
conditions when considering alliance building and will certainly have an impact on allied 
space coalition structural decisions. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
As alluded to in previous sections, the research method supporting this thesis 
follows a comparative approach addressing three naval missions in Europe and in the Indo-
Pacific. The research is scoped to focus only on existing allies with significant navies and 
space capabilities in each theater: France, United Kingdom, and Germany in Europe; and 
Japan, South Korea, and Australia in the Indo-Pacific. The three missions: 
communications, maritime domain awareness (MDA), and meteorological support, 
provide the basis for examples of future or existing cooperation and interoperability, and 
how they are enhanced by leveraging the space domain. Within that framework, this thesis 
weighs the risks and benefits of each of the three possible allied cooperation structures: 
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bilateral, regional, or global, and, in its conclusion, provides recommendations for U.S. 
policy. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is structured in five parts with the first and last section being the 
introduction and conclusion. The second chapter, following the introduction, sets the stage 
and establishes the role of space in the maritime domain specifically in an era of renewed 
great power competition. The remaining two body chapters consist of two regional case 
studies examining Europe and the Indo-Pacific, respectively. Each regional chapter has a 
short conclusion section discussing the evidence presented in the chapter as it pertains to 
the various possible alliance systems or structures. The conclusion follows with a more 
robust analysis of findings, identifying the best structure for an allied space coalition. 
Moreover, it highlights how strengthening traditional alliances and developing formal 
space cooperation can be used as true force multiplier to meet the maritime challenges of 
the day in the context of great power competition with Russia and China. 
13 
II. RENEWED GREAT POWER COMPETITION: THE ROLE OF 
SPACE IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN 
This chapter establishes an overview of the United States’ great power adversaries 
and their use of space, especially as it pertains to the maritime domain. Specific challenges 
faced by navies operating at sea are addressed, as well as some of the space resources naval 
forces require for effective operations. Finally, a brief description of the role of maritime 
allies and the components critical to successfully leveraging these relationships as a force 
multiplier, is presented. The following sections are meant to set the stage for the regional 
case studies seen in Chapters III and IV. 
Since the advent of space technology, the military application of this technology 
has been a focus of nations, especially the great powers. As it stands, aside from the United 
States, only Russia and China have significantly expanded their military space activities 
beyond reconnaissance.37 Our rivals undoubtedly recognize the strategic necessity of 
space, especially as it pertains to the maritime domain. Writing in 1898, Mahan asserted 
that unmolested trade and shipping must be protected to ensure the welfare of a country.38 
Our rival great powers understand the importance of the maritime realm to their national 
interest. This can be seen by Russia’s struggle with economic sanctions and the challenges 
it faces in energy exports; and China, the newly emerged global economic driver, seeking 
to advance its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Current military space activities consist 
mostly of supporting functions, enabling forces to operate more effectively in the air, on 
the ground, and in this case, most importantly— at sea.39 
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A. GREAT POWER ADVERSARIES: SPACE IN SUPPORT OF MARITIME 
OPERATIONS 
Despite a downturn in the decade following the disbandment of the Soviet Union 
in 1991, Russia remains an international power in space. Russian President Vladimir Putin 
has stressed that space will allow their Armed Forces to reach their maximum potential, 
and that the Army and Navy must be prepared for an armed struggle. In 2018 Russian 
Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu stated regarding his president’s comments: “The solution 
of this problem doubtlessly depends directly on the availability of a modern orbital 
constellation of military satellites.”40  Russia views the United States and NATO as the 
principal threats to its security and geopolitical aspirations, in turn precipitating Naval 
doctrine to project power in the Mediterranean, counter NATO forces, and secure the 
Arctic, specifically the Northern Sea Route, and its improved shipping routes.41 Russian 
military thinking, determined by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), finds space 
critical to these efforts given the “growing role of precision weapons and satellite-
supported information networks in all types of conflict.”42 Some examples of these efforts 
include Russia’s nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine fleet modernization effort for 
strategic deterrence, use of the KALIBR land attack cruise missiles in precision strikes, as 
seen in Syria in October 2015, and coastal defense through anti-ship missile systems such 
as the STYX or SEPAL.43  
In spite of Russia’s own buildup of space-based capabilities, they believe America 
to be over reliant on space, an “Achilles’ heel,” that they seek to neutralize, thereby 
offsetting a perceived military advantage.44 To this end, electronic warfare (EW) is a high 
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priority for Russian maritime military operations. Capabilities to jam communication 
uplinks, and spoof, or jam positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) systems are being 
developed.45 Assessed by the DIA, use of EW provides advantages twofold: First the 
technical disruption, denying an adversary use of a specified system, and secondly the 
capability to introduce confusion into the ranks of adversary decision makers, allowing 
“Russian forces to seize the operational initiative.”46 The  Russian General Staff believes 
that wartime strategies must be adopted that disrupt the information support and military 
C2 of adversaries, which in an era of informatized and network-centric warfare, is of vital 
importance.47 Furthermore, the DIA concludes that Russia is of the belief that “the military 
capabilities to counter space operations will deter aggression by space-enabled adversaries 
and enable Russia to control escalation of conflict if deterrence fails.”48 The authors of 
Global Counterspace Capabilities contend that Russian military operations actively 
employ counterspace capabilities, with evidence to support its use in the operations in 
eastern Ukraine.49 This experience and technological foundation throughout Russian 
military and space programs can only serve to strengthen the need to be mindful of Russian 
counterspace capabilities.  
Russian counterspace doctrine only begins with EW. Its counterspace programs are 
robust, with advances in more conventional hard kill focused methods and a divergence 
into cyber operations. In July 2018, Russian Aerospace Forces began to receive a laser 
weapon system, likely for use as a ground based ASAT.50 Further evidence indicates that 
Russia has revived a Soviet era program to field an aircraft-borne laser system to target 
adversary imagery satellites, although this is not assessed to be operationally capable.51 
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Russia has a proven capability of direct ascent ASATs, however this is assessed by the 
Secure World Foundation as unlikely to pose a critical threat to U.S. assets, due to the 
limited capacity on hand, and technological limitations capable of only targeting LEO 
satellites.52  
In addition, the DIA reports that in 2017 Russia deployed a dual-use co-orbital 
system, which it described as an “inspector satellite capable of diagnosing the technical 
condition of a Russian satellite from the closest possible distance.”53 In the same report, 
the DIA maintains that this inspection technology could also be used to approach, and 
conduct an attack on an adversary’s satellite, and that this “behavior is inconsistent with 
on-orbit inspection activities or space situational awareness capabilities.” Finally, 
regarding Russian cyber operations, Weeden and Samson report the Russian belief that 
information dominance operations begin prior to a conflict and that denying or corrupting 
space-based information will “mislead an adversary into making decisions contrary to their 
military objectives.”54 The DIA supports this viewpoint, reporting on military academics 
who propose the fusion of EW and cyber operations in an effort to disrupt the 
electromagnetic spectrum, and “to corrupt and disable computers and networked 
systems.”55 Russian perception of future threats and the nature of warfare are fairly well 
understood, in that space is critical to modern military and maritime operations, and Russia 
will certainly continue investment in and reliance upon the space domain.56 
China relies upon the maritime domain as an integral part to both its continued 
economic rise through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and its greater strategic planning 
calculus. The South China Sea is a central focus of Chinese national interests, and a source 
of dispute, reflected in the territorial claim of the nine-dash line, which overlaps the 
exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of five other nations in Southeast Asia — Brunei, 
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Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.57 Tensions grow as China seeks to 
impose its will on the region, initially having risen from the discovery of robust natural 
resources in the 1960s, specifically, oil and natural gas, and now ranging from sovereignty 
disputes to fisheries claims.58 For these reasons, the DIA suspects that Chinese military 
planners find “its future wars mostly will be fought outside its borders and will involve 
conflict in the maritime domain.”59 For China to assert itself and project power broadly 
throughout the region and defeat high-tech adversaries, namely the United States, control 
of and access to space as the ultimate high ground, is essential.60 
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was directed by Beijing in 2015 to be able to 
win “informatized local wars” in the context of military struggle at sea.61 This resulted in 
the creation of the Strategic Support Force (SSF), with a focus on space systems and 
satellite launch operations to support the PLA in the following missions: ISR, navigation, 
and communication.62 Chinese naval strategy is very pointed in its intent to modernize its 
maritime force, as quoted in a DIA excerpt of China’s Military Strategy, a modern 
maritime force will “safeguard its national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, 
[and] protect the security of strategic SLOCs (sea lines of communication) and overseas 
interests.”63 The People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) draws heavily on the SSF space 
network not directly for combat operations, but as a means of enabling long-range, off-
shore operations. Their ISR systems are used to monitor, track, and target United States 
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and allied forces throughout the Indo-Pacific.64 The DOD 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy 
Report lists space as one of China’s military programs of investment to provide “anti-
access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, which could be used to prevent countries from 
operating in areas near China’s periphery,” meaning the South China Sea, East China Sea 
and region of the Korean Peninsula.65 The PLA operates four dedicated military satellite 
communication (SATCOM) assets enabling Command and Control (C2) of maritime 
forces, and is investing further in quantum-enabled communications for even more highly 
secure communications.66 As of June 2020, China has completed its domestic PNT system, 
Beidou, granting PLAN ships and coastal defense forces PNT data for navigation and 
advanced weapons systems, not only throughout the Indo-Pacific, but globally, as China 
continues operations outside its traditional sphere of influence.  
Chinese counterspace capabilities pertaining to maritime operations have centered 
on electronic warfare (EW). Their doctrine emphasizes EW weapons to “suppress or 
deceive” adversaries’ equipment.67 China has proven proficient in GPS jamming 
capabilities and, in April 2018, satellite imagery confirmed the use of mobile military 
jamming trucks located on Mischief Reef, in the South China Sea.68 The Chinese continue 
to invest in jamming capabilities of SATCOM, with evidence of specific capacity against 
the protected military frequency of extremely high frequency (EHF), as well as jamming 
of synthetic aperture radar (SAR) platforms like LEO reconnaissance satellites.69 As early 
as 2005–06, reports emerged on the possibility that China had begun testing directed-
energy weapons, blinding United States optical surveillance satellites.70 It is assessed that 
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by 2020 China will likely field a fully capable ground-based laser weapon with the 
potential to counter sensors on LEO satellites, and by the mid-to-late 2020s may field a 
new laser that could threaten the structure of the satellite itself.71  Space is integral to the 
military strategy of the PLAN. It enhances their own operations and provides the capacity 
to enact their A2/AD strategy for the Indo-Pacific. They look to space to degrade the 
capabilities of their adversaries and will likely continue to invest in these capabilities.  
B. CHALLENGES IN THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT AND THE 
OPPORTUNITY OF SPACE  
There are inherent risks and challenges to operating at sea posed by unpredictable 
weather, and the maritime environment. Many of the same obstacles faced during the days 
of sail, still challenge navies of today, albeit they are addressed entirely differently, by 
using technologies of the modern era. Vast distances, unpredictable weather, and simply 
the sheer size of the maritime battlespace present challenges to naval operations. Couple 
the natural challenges of the environment with revisionist great powers, and one begins to 
understand the current scope of the challenges faced by the United States Navy and its 
allies.  
1. Communications  
Arguably the most important component of any military operation is the ability to 
communicate. Whether it is communication between ships, aircraft, or to higher 
headquarters, no major naval operation can succeed without the ability to transmit orders, 
direct movement of forces, or coordinate efforts. Modern naval operations take place 
thousands of miles away from home port, and the operational units themselves are often 
geographically dispersed, thereby only increasing the need for long-range communications 
provided by SATCOM. In the modern era of network-centric warfare, communication at 
sea is expanded well beyond traditional measures. As discussed in a Naval Research 
Council study, these expanded communications include “command and control, battle 
management, the dissemination of common operational and tactical pictures, sensor-data 
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dissemination, the tracking and engagement of time-sensitive and other targets, and many 
other C4ISR functions.”72   
The extraordinary demand for non-voice communication, enabling Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) functions of a modern navy, presents its own challenge. Witnessed during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, even with the new Global Broadcast System (GBS) operating in 
the EHF spectrum with broad area coverage and spot beam technology, naval ships 
received only 20 Mbps, which proved inadequate for operational requirements.73 Without 
reliable access to SATCOM for beyond line of sight (BLOS) communication, a navy is 
limited to HF systems. This is concerning for several reasons. HF is limited in range, data 
speeds, bandwidth, and reliability, and is far too easy for adversaries to intercept using high 
frequency direction finding (HF/DF) technology.74    
For the U.S. Navy, the challenge of maintaining a secure, reliable, and resilient 
communication architecture is crucial for effective operations at sea. Without modern 
SATCOM, the full capability of the Navy cannot be realized, and it would be forced to fall 
back upon capability-limiting technology from yesteryear.  
2. Maritime Domain Awareness  
An effective communication architecture is critical for command-and-control 
functions and an enabling factor for the maritime domain awareness (MDA) mission. From 
the National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan (NMDAP), this mission is defined as “the 
effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact 
the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States.”75 Although generated 
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by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the definition remains sound, and is the 
same definition that Admiral Michael G. Mullen used during his tenure as the Chief of 
Naval Operations.76 Without the ability to communicate and report on vessels, aircraft, or 
other items of interest to the MDA mission, commanders would be rendered unable to 
make sound and efficient decisions.  
Aside from the supporting role of communications, the MDA mission itself is 
complicated simply by operating in such a vast environment. The conventional assets 
required to gain an effective understanding of everything within the maritime domain are 
extraordinary. This is the opportunity provided by space. Satellite assets do not require the 
sleep, maintenance, or fuel required by a commensurate terrestrial platform. Throughout 
Southeast Asia, for example, despite the widely acknowledged MDA challenge, Mike Yeo 
asserts: “nations have not actively pursued maritime patrol aircraft, or MPA, preferring 
instead to prioritize other acquisitions in the face of budget requirements.”77 The costs of 
these sophisticated aircraft are prohibitive, which makes satellites an attractive alternative. 
They need not be nationally owned to enjoy their benefits, and the data provided by such 
an asset can be sold and shared amongst allies, at a fraction of the cost of a nationally 
owned maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), such as the P-8A Poseidon. The U.S. and allied 
countries have robust space-based ISR capabilities including: ELINT, EO/IR, and SAR 
satellites. These platforms, argues the National Research Council, contribute to the MDA 
mission by providing “Target identification, location, and tracking.”78 Aircraft, ships, and 
other platforms contributing to the combined maritime picture can never achieve the 
persistence or coverage capacity provided by a satellite. This is not to rule out the role 
conventional platforms, for they still provide vast data within the MDA framework. It is 
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simply to highlight the opportunity that space provides for persistent coverage and 
contribution to the data-fusion efforts. Additionally, the majority of conventional maritime 
surveillance systems currently rely upon satellite technology at least in part, and, as argued 
by Nardon and Venet, the capabilities of other systems “could be strongly enhanced by the 
use of space.”79 
3. Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations 
Military operations have two major sources of risk: unpredicted enemy activities 
and unpredictability of the environment.80  Anyone who has been to sea can understand 
the vast variability in weather patterns and environmental conditions. Weather can change 
hour by hour, and mile by mile, impacting navigation, communication, and operability of 
integral sensors. This unpredictability can cause major damage, loss of life, and, in the 
worst cases, even the sinking of the ships themselves. In World War II Admiral Halsey lost 
three destroyers from Task Force 38; limited by technology of the time, weather forecasters 
on the Third Fleet Staff, had very little capability to track typhoons and other weather 
patterns.81 On December 18, 1944, a major storm in the Philippine Sea struck Task Force 
38 and sank three destroyers: USS Hull, USS Spence, and USS Monaghan with nearly all 
hands onboard.82 In total, nearly 790 men were lost, another 80 wounded, with fires further 
destroying 146 planes, in addition to the three warships.83 
Similar, to how effective communications are inherent to the MDA mission, 
meteorological data plays a supporting role to many naval missions, not just for weather 
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prediction but estimates on sensor performance in all domains. The purpose of 
meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) operations, outlined in Joint Publication 
3-59, is to generate METOC information, which is defined as: “Actionable information to 
include meteorological, climatological, oceanographic, and space environment 
observations, analyses, prognostic data or products, and meteorological and oceanographic 
effects.”84 More plainly stated, in JP 3-59, “METOC support is critical to providing the 
commander with awareness of the environmental components of the operational 
environment (OE) and the ability to exploit that awareness to gain an operational advantage 
during military operations.”85 Without effective METOC products, modern naval 
operations will continue to be influenced and degraded by environmental uncertainty.  
To date, the majority of observational data used by the METOC community is 
derived from satellites or other automated weather stations.86 This data is used by METOC 
forces to model degradation to communications, radars, and navigation systems, allowing 
commanders to better understand the mission impact.87 Meteorological satellite data is 
widely disseminated and available through various near-real time means such as direct 
broadcast, Global Telecommunication System (GTS), or simply from the internet.88 
Furthermore METOC data can be optimized, persistent, and in many instances made more 
timely through the use of satellites, either for initial observation or dissemination. As noted 
in JP 3-59, effective METOC data is leveraged by commanders to exploit the environment, 
by “minimizing or mitigating any negative effects of the environment on friendly forces 
while simultaneously capitalizing on conditions that maximize the operational advantage 
over enemy forces.”89 
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The United States Navy and its allies continue to face uncertainty at sea, in both 
routine operations and any future conflict. METOC data, in terms of reliability, accuracy, 
and ease of dissemination remains an operational necessity. This can be achieved through 
the use of satellites and their hosted sensors. Space provides a means of efficient 
dissemination of data from shore facilities to sea, as well as the capability to collect 
observations in the first place. This technology is integral to naval operations, providing 
sound environmental estimates for operational planning and mission execution.90  
C. SPACE: A FORCE MULTIPLIER IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN   
The scope and resources required for effective maritime security efforts have 
changed dramatically since the Cold War, requiring a new way of conducting operations 
in the maritime domain. Announced in 2005 by then-CNO Admiral Mike Mullen, an 
international collaborative maritime design was proposed, initially branded the “1,000-ship 
Navy” or Global Maritime Partnership (GMP).91 This was in recognition of the emerging 
“dynamic maritime security landscape” spanning a broad range of missions, in which the 
authors of Maritime Security Partnerships determined “No single navy or nation can do 
this alone.”92 In 2014, Admiral Jonathan Greenert found a need to move beyond the 
framework of GMP, and proposed a Global Network of Navies (GNoN), which would 
“allow countries with converging interests in the maritime domain to form mission-
focused—often temporary—goal-oriented associations to address common maritime-
security challenges,” which he proposed was more efficient because it did not require the 
years needed in developing close partnerships.93 Admiral Greenert was recognizing the 
fiscal challenges faced by modern navies, and the need for low-cost, innovative avenues to 
address emerging threats and instability.94 Space is the innovative avenue and, when 
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managed correctly, can be relatively low-cost compared to resources required to field 
conventional naval assets with an equivalent capability. In the context of maritime domain 
awareness, which is critical to ensuring maritime security, satellite constellations will act 
as a force multiplier, reducing the need for costly conventional warships and presence 
operations.  
1. Alliance Building  
To fully address the three structures of allied space cooperation outlined in Chapter 
I, and to evaluate their merit over the next two chapters, through regional case studies of 
Europe and the Indo-Pacific, a baseline must be established for what an alliance is and the 
key components of a stable alliance. Claudette Roulo writes that for the DOD, a true 
alliance relationship is that in which a formal agreement between two or more nations has 
been reached, and this relationship will have signed documentation that “promises each 
nation will support the other, particularly during war.”95 Anything less formal than a 
“treaty ally” would fall under a partnership, or what is often termed a “strategic 
partnership,” and is often used in “information exchanges” and to build mutually beneficial 
cooperation.96 The United States has traditionally entered bilateral and multilateral 
alliances in which it could best leverage its power.97 As explained by Gause et al., many 
of its naval alliances were designed to “counter an expansionist Soviet aggressor.”98 Given 
the renewed desire for cooperation and allied engagement over the last eleven years, the 
historical nature of the United States’ naval alliances will need to be accounted for.  
The benefits of military alliances and partnerships are transparent on the surface; 
however, there can be some drawbacks to these relationships. Nations will often enter an 
alliance with the purpose of sharing costs, and risks, and increasing their chances of 
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success; in short, an alliance is a means of increasing security and can be used as deterrence 
against external aggression.99 That being said, there is a major hurdle that merits 
acknowledging, as it is a key component in any cooperative structure, be it a formal treaty 
alliance or strategic partnership. The idea that states make policy concessions, or at a 
minimum must be more flexible in their foreign policy decisions when entering a military 
alliance is a factor to balance against a nation’s security interests.100 This balance, also, 
must be accounted for when considering the size and nature of any cooperative efforts, 
especially when bearing in mind larger multinational efforts or a global coalition structure.  
2. Interoperability within Coalitions  
The effectiveness of any potential coalition or alliance is limited in some regard by 
the ability of the member nations’ militaries to interact and operate together. In the same 
line of thinking, for space to be used as a force multiplier, these militaries’ space systems, 
must also have some commonality in technology or communication structure. Considering 
that security issues rarely fit so neatly into one region or subregion, and often cross these 
geographic boundaries, it is in the interest of the United States and partner nations to have 
the ability to broadly share information.101 This gives rise to the concept of 
interoperability.  
From the Center for Strategic Studies, “Interoperability is defined as the ability of 
systems, units and forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, 
units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively 
together.”102 Strictly speaking, the technological ability to exchange data and information, 
is not the sole impediment to interoperability. The legal issue of sharing data, which may 
be tied up in confidentiality agreements, can be a larger impediment than the 
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technology.103 Within the coalition structure, Dittmer proposes: “Other states may well 
agree that their data are a sovereign resource not to be shared.”104 So, in approaching any 
form of allied or partner cooperation, as derived from U.S. Navy Interoperability with Its 
High-End Allies, it will be important to remember that “seamless interoperability between 
the U.S. Navy and allied navies is not likely. It is probably an unachievable goal.”105 
Seamless integration could be viewed as the ultimate goal, however, with the 
understanding that— for financial, political, legal, or other technological reasons— it may 
not be fully realized. Militaries are not exempt from their broader national economies, and 
even when military readiness appears to be stable, Dittmer argues, it “may reach a tipping 
point in which certain military capabilities dissipate.”106 This ebb and flow in capability 
and funding of individual nations will simply become a part of the greater structure to be 
balanced by the remaining partner nations. Whether it is caused by funding, politics, or 
other motivations, there will be always be some form of interoperability gap, albeit likely 
an asymmetric and volatile gap. As highlighted by Gause et al., in a report from the Center 
for Strategic Studies, “The best that the U.S. and its allies can hope for is to intelligently 
manage the gap to prevent it from metastasizing to the point where coalitions are not able 
to work around issues that could threaten the operation.”107 
D. CONCLUSION 
Having established the conditions and context of which an allied maritime space 
coalition must operate, the following two chapters endeavor to examine various coalition 
structures, and their merits and shortfalls for addressing the strategic problems of Europe 
and the Indo-Pacific. Chapter III has a focus on competition with Russia in the 
Mediterranean and Arctic Oceans, addressing regional allies, specifically: Germany, 
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France, and the United Kingdom. Whereas Chapter IV similarly has a regional focus, 
addressing the Chinese influence over the South China Sea through the Korean Peninsula, 
and the role of alliances with Japan, Australia, and South Korea. Ultimately as stated in 
Chapter I, the end state is to formulate the most beneficial space coalition structure to meet 
the maritime the challenges of the day, as pertaining to great power competition in these 
strategically important regions.  
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III. BUILDING A EUROPEAN SPACE COALITION TO SUPPORT 
NAVY OPERATIONS 
Having established the contextual framework, and defined the intended scope of 
discussion in Chapter II, a case study and examination of current U.S. allies and their roles 
in varying space coalition structures is examined in Chapter III. To this end, the chapter 
opens with a discussion of the strategic challenges faced in the European theater pertaining 
to maritime competition with Russia and the existing organizations that will have an 
influence on the politics at play. Current alliances with Germany, France, and the United 
Kingdom are evaluated in terms of their space programs, the state of space cooperation 
with the United States, and capabilities they possess that might offer avenues for further or 
future space cooperation. The third part of this chapter addresses the capabilities of our 
allies and their impact on specific naval missions: communication, MDA, and METOC. 
The chapter concludes with a comparison of the three proposed allied space cooperation 
structures, seeking to build a foundation of evidence, that is the basis for proposing policy 
recommendations and determination of the best allied space cooperation structure offered 
in Chapter V.  
A. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE 
The strategic and political interests of the United States and its allies throughout 
Europe are threatened by Russia’s aggressive actions and use of force, which NATO 
describes as “undermin[ing] Euro-Atlantic security and the rules-based international 
order.”108 Argued by Abenheim, et. al., “The U.S. Navy has long been the backbone of 
U.S. global influence and leadership,” resulting in the “necessity for this nation to project 
significant power in maritime forces throughout the world’s oceans.”109 Renewed Russian 
aggression, first seen in 2008 with the case of Georgia, and more recently the actions in 
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Crimea and Syria— in 2014-present and 2016-present— only serve to further highlight the 
“importance of the U.S. Navy in this moment of geopolitical shift.”110 
1. Mediterranean and the Arctic  
When considering the maritime realm within the European theater, there are two 
unique subregions that have emerged in recent years as points of contention and strategic 
importance: the Mediterranean Sea and the Arctic. These regions are of great strategic and 
economic value to Russian security and geopolitical aspirations. That said, Russian military 
strategy has the aim of countering U.S. and NATO forces throughout these regions. 
Likewise, the United States and its European allies have vested interests in regional 
security, freedom of navigation, and the natural resources of the same regions. Similarly, 
the Baltic and Black Seas remain bastions of Russian influence and activity, parallels seen 
from Cold War, where Abenheim et al. attest these seas are the “border between the NATO 
central front and its northern flank”.111 However, current naval operations and strategic 
interest are vastly more prevalent throughout the Mediterranean and expanding into the 
Arctic. To this end, further exploration, and discussion of the Baltic and Black Seas have 
been withheld, while maintaining that the utility of allied space cooperation realized in the 
Mediterranean and Arctic will likewise apply to other European regions.  
The Mediterranean Sea is a strategic crossroads between Europe, the Middle East, 
and Africa. Writing for the Hoover Institution, Jakub Grygiel asserts: “Because the 
Mediterranean is recognized as a lever of influence over Europe, it has always attracted 
external powers whose interests transcend this sea and focus on Europe.”112 Grygiel 
expands further on this notion, highlighting the importance of the American transatlantic 
partnership when he states “the stability of the Mediterranean can be guaranteed only when 
one power (or friendly powers) controls access to it as well as its circumference.”113 
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NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg echoes many of these sentiments. Discussing 
Russian activity in his 2020 Annual Report, the Secretary General states: “Russia’s 
behaviour remains assertive and destabilising, and terrorism continues to represent a global 
security challenge and a threat to stability.”114 Further commenting that the security 
challenges are too big for any “ally to face alone,” Stoltenberg argues for his 2030 
initiative, “strengthening the transatlantic bond and doing more together.” The NATO 
Mediterranean dialogue “reflects the Alliance’s view that security in Europe is closely 
linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean.”115 Ultimately, if U.S. interests 
remain aligned with Europe, the Mediterranean will continue as a strategic focal point.  
With vast resources and economically advantageous sea routes opening as a result 
of receding polar ice caps, the Arctic has become a source of international friction. A DOD 
report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage details that the region 
is “warming on average twice as fast as the rest of the planet, resulting in increased human 
activity in the region.”116 The United States Geological Survey (USGS) estimates that 
roughly 22% of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas reserves reside in the Arctic.117 By 
Russian estimates, reported by Darren Boyle, the natural resources alone in the Arctic are 
worth well over $30 trillion.118 The Russians view the Arctic as their backyard and 
territory. To this end, in 2007, a Russian submarine planted a rust-proof titanium flag on 
the seabed of the North Pole, a depth of 4,261 meters, symbolically staking their claim.119 
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The Russian Federation submitted a claim to the U.N. in 2015 for 463,000 square miles of 
the Arctic, expanding their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) out to 350 NM, 150 NM in 
excess of the 200 NM recognized by international law and ratified in the United Nations 
Convention for Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS).120 In response to the resources at stake, as of 
May 2020, Norway and Denmark have filed similar claims to extend their EEZs, with the 
Canadians preparing to submit their own claim.121 Michael Murphy, the State 
Department’s deputy assistant secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, when asked 
about Russian military expansion in the Arctic, including the establishment of an Arctic 
base, coastal missile batteries, early warning radars and air defenses, testified in February 
2020: “Russia’s military buildup in the Arctic threatens the United States’ and NATO’s 
northern flank.”122 Murphy concluded: “In short, NATO’s northern flank must once again 
command the attention of the United States and its allies.”123 
2. Maritime Challenges 
Maritime challenges faced throughout the entire European theater have emerged 
because of both geopolitics of the region and great power competition with Russia. 
Furthermore, the geography and interconnectedness of the overall European region present 
additional challenges to be faced by maritime forces throughout the Mediterranean and the 
Arctic. 
a. The Mediterranean 
United States strategic goals in the Mediterranean are to counter Russian expansion, 
show strong regional leadership in concert with NATO allies, and engage in regional power 
projection. This is accomplished through multinational naval exercises, assisting in 
maritime security efforts, and providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/
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DR). Chris Gibson of the Hoover Institution contends that Russian escalation and 
investment in Syria is a means to “shore up Russian control of the Port of Tartus,” and their 
diplomatic relations with Turkey are “designed to drive a wedge in NATO and further 
Russian influence in the Mediterranean region.”124 The way forward, Gibson argues, is to 
double down on alliances and cooperation in the region. Citing limited resources of the 
United States, Gibson proposes that “We can’t be everywhere, all the time, and thus a major 
shift in resources to the Mediterranean is not possible, nor needed.”125 The challenges will 
need to be met through innovation and cooperation, not simply through American finances.  
A RAND report contends that Europe’s greatest challenge found in the 
Mediterranean is the issue of migration.126 Political instability throughout much of the 
Eastern Mediterranean, stemming initially from the December 2010 Arab Spring, has 
generated a refugee crisis. Rubin and Eiran write: “the sea is the primary route to refuge, 
with approximately 95 percent of refugees crossing the Mediterranean.”127 Data from the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) shows that from 2014 to April 
17, 2021, an estimated 2,194,696 refugees had entered European countries, and 20,897 
were missing or lost their lives in the attempted passage.128 
Amongst this unrest and instability, many maritime challenges have arisen both 
directly and indirectly. As stated previously, irregular migration is one of the greatest 
challenges; however, increased maritime terrorism and piracy have resulted from the 
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instability of the region.129 NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian (OSG), launched in 
November 2016, is a maritime security operations (MSO) initiative that has been 
conducting three primary tasks: “maritime security capacity building; support to maritime 
situational awareness; and support to maritime counter-terrorism.”130 NATO Alliance 
Maritime Strategy notes that alliance maritime operations will in part include “Conducting 
surveillance and patrolling, and sharing information thus gathered, in support of law 
enforcement in the course of, and as part of, their scheduled NATO activities and 
deployments within the North Atlantic Treaty Area.”131 These NATO forces, specifically, 
conduct information sharing and provide logistical support to Eunavfor Med and Frontex, 
the EU Border and Coast Guard Agency managing Operation Sophia, the naval operation 
“aimed to disrupt the business model of migrant smuggling and human trafficking in the 
Mediterranean.”132 The challenges faced in Europe are intricately linked with the EU and 
NATO.  
b. The Arctic 
American strategic challenges in the Arctic are derived more so from competition 
over natural resources, the need to uphold freedom of navigation along the North Sea Route 
(NSR), and the ability to enforce sanctions on Russia.133 The United States Navy Strategic 
Outlook for the Arctic presents the following maritime security challenges facing Arctic 
operations: “defending sea lines of communication and the homeland from seaborne 
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attacks, maritime domain awareness, and supporting Coast Guard operations as 
required.”134 More specifically, the challenges for maritime forces, at least in the near 
term, are a result of the harsh conditions and operational environment in the high north. A 
DOD report to Congress identified the following key challenges to Arctic operations: 
“shortfalls in ice and weather reporting and forecasting; limitations in C4ISR due to lack 
of assets and harsh environmental conditions; limited inventory of ice-capable vessels; and 
limited shore-based infrastructure.”135 The Hoover Institution expounds upon the issue of 
the environment, proposing that “Only a small percentage of the Arctic has been surveyed; 
thus navigation and communications systems, commonplace in other regions of the world, 
are absent or spotty.”136  
Communications themselves are further complicated when operating above 70°N. 
As determined by the DOD, this is the result of “magnetic and solar phenomena that 
degrade High-Frequency (HF) radio signals, limited surface-based relays outside of 
Alaska, and geostationary satellite geometry.”137 The DOD assesses that the current 
communications architecture is adequate for single-ship operations, but, “is insufficient to 
support normal operational practices of a surface action group or any large-scale Joint 
Force operations.”138 To meet the strategic challenges found in the Arctic, the Navy must 
have the forces and be able to communicate while generating a sound and complete 
common operational picture (COP) of the area of operations (AO). In summary, the DOD 
has determined that it requires “the capability to monitor and assess human activity in the 
Arctic persistently in order to support evolving defense, safety, and security efforts 
adequately.”139 
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The current United States and NATO maritime posture is inadequate, failing to 
keep pace with Russian naval modernization and “stand-off capabilities designed to 
challenge the international order at sea.”140 Discussing the American strategic 
competitors’ investments in Arctic infrastructure designed to degrade American influence 
and the rule of law, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) assesses that “this has resulted 
in a strategic resource gap that threatens the Nation’s ability to effectively uphold 
sovereignty.”141 A common theme seen both when considering the Mediterranean and 
Arctic, is a lack of resources and need to maximize efficiency of effort. As stated by 
Abenheim, et. al., “Americans today have become accustomed to the idea that U.S. military 
power has unimpeded access to all corners of globe as if such a fact were an eternal 
right.”142 Unfortunately this is not a reality, and the need for allies and the inability to go 
it alone has been brought to the forefront.  
3. NATO and the European Union  
The importance of NATO and the European Union (E.U.) cannot be understated 
when considering space cooperation and maritime security throughout the Mediterranean 
and the Arctic. The U.S. mission to NATO argues that “NATO remains the principal 
security instrument of the transatlantic community” and that NATO provides “security 
support” in particular to the E.U.143 Furthermore, in November 2019, NATO declared 
space to be an operational domain, where Defense News reports NATO secretary General 
Jens Stoltenberg saying “This can allow NATO planners to make requests for allies to 
provide capabilities and services, such as hours of satellite communications,” and that 
space is “essential to the alliance’s deterrence and defense, including the ability to navigate, 
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gather intelligence and to detect missile launches.”144 In terms of intelligence collection 
and analysis, much of which is derived from national assets and other space-borne systems, 
David Weber reports for the Atlantic Council that NATO members frequently share 
intelligence data and, specifically, “The United Kingdom, France, and Germany alone add 
40,000 intelligence personnel to the Alliance’s intelligence capabilities.”145 
The three European countries examined throughout the remainder of this chapter 
—Germany, France, and the United Kingdom— are all active members of NATO. 
However, adding further political complexity to the mix, France and Germany remain part 
of the E.U., while the United Kingdom left the organization as part of the controversial 
BREXIT, effective January 2020. The withdrawal by the UK, suggests Ana Isabel Xavier, 
raises questions concerning security and defense and about the UK’s role in the “collective 
and multilateral efforts within the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) after Brexit.”146 As such, any endeavor toward generating an allied 
space coalition with the UK and other European countries, must account for the 
organization structure, relationships, and complexities of NATO and the E.U.  
B. ALLIES AND REGIONAL PARTNERS: COOPERATION AND 
CAPABILITIES 
Having discussed the strategic challenges and overview of the European AO, this 
section examines their military space programs and details the space assets, capabilities, 
and potential for cooperation to be had with Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. 
In an effort to recognize bias, it is necessary to concede that France receives more attention 
than Germany or the United Kingdom. This is not intended for any reason other than the 
lead France holds over its European peers in terms of military space, as well as the larger 
architecture of military space assets to discuss. Furthermore, the intent is not to cover every 
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satellite owned or operated by these countries, rather to look at specific military systems 
that have been developed and have potential to be integrated into an allied space coalition 
supporting naval operations. To this end, it must be acknowledged that commercial 
satellites play a predominant role in supplementing military satellite capabilities; however, 
they too have been withheld from discussion, as they are outside of the scope of military 
cooperation. Moreover, the intent is to provide evidence to be examined in the following 
section as to how they could enhance specified naval missions.  
1. Germany 
Responsibility for the military space domain in Germany falls to the Federal 
Ministry of Defense. However, different than many other countries, the United States 
included, The space strategy of the German Federal Government states: “in Germany, 
innovations in the space sector tend to stem mostly from technologies developed for civil 
and scientific applications,” rather than the military itself as the main driver.147 All this 
technology development has led to a reality in which Josué Michels reports “Germany’s 
space expertise is in spying and surveillance.”148 
Within the German military or Bundeswehr, the Air Force is the branch responsible 
for space, recently establishing a new Air and Space Operations Centre (ASOC) in 
November 2020, according to Dominic Vogel, in recognition of “growing military impor-
tance of space as an operational dimension.”149 The Bundeswehr currently has two 
MILSAT systems directly under its control: the SAR-Lupe system and COMSATBw.150 
The Bundeswehr will also have access to a series of three intelligence satellites, nicknamed 
project Georg, which the German government has invested 400 million euros ($465 
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million) in service of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (Foreign Intelligence Service).151 In 
addition to the domestically owned systems, Berlin reached an agreement in April 2015 
with the French Space Agency, in which it paid 210 million euros for access rights to 
imagery from Composante Spatiale Optique (CSO) 3, a high-resolution electro-optical 
reconnaissance satellite.152 
The SAR-Lupe system was the first dedicated German MILSAT system.153 The 
U.S.’s refusal to share intelligence data with non-U.S. allied forces during the NATO action 
in Kosovo (1998-1999), motivated Germany to develop its own intelligence capability.154 
In 2000, at the NATO Summit in Prague, Germany committed to the SAR-Lupe project 
because they felt, as Chris Pocock explains, there were “shortcomings in the alliance’s 
operational capabilities.”155 Shortly after the announcement, in 2002, Germany signed a 
data-sharing agreement with the French, granting access to SAR-Lupe in exchange for 
limited access to their complementary system,  Helios II optical reconnaissance 
satellites.156 The prime contractor for the project, OHB-System AG of Bremen, built 
ground stations in both France and Germany, part of what the ESA Earth Observation 
Portal describes as a “bilateral French-German program called E-SGA (Europäisierung der 
satellitengestützten Aufklärung),” an effort to combine space-based assets of multiple 
nations into a usable system.157 
The constellation, launched between 2006–2008, is a series of five SAR 
reconnaissance satellites (SAR-Lupe 1–5) with a ten year design life based on a variety of 
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factors, including available fuel for onboard hydrazine thrusters, which adjust for altitude 
decay.158 ESA Earth Observation Portal provides the following objectives of the system: 
“event monitoring capability independent of weather and illumination conditions,” 
assisting the military in operations planning, and support to “deployed forces with frequent 
event-driven intelligence.”159 The satellites image in the X-Band (8-12 GHz), with 
resolution estimated at 0.5-1.0 meter.160 Operating in LEO orbit with an average altitude 
of 500 km, and a period of 94.3 minutes, helps the system to achieve greater revisit 
times.161 SAR-Lupe uses an encrypted S-Band (2-4 GHz) uplink and crosslink to ensure 
secure data transfer, while using the same antenna for X-Band imaging and data 
downlink.162 Writing in C4ISR-The Journal of Net-Centric Warfare, Pocock reports the 
system to be capable of producing greater than 30 images/day with coverage from 80 
degrees south to 80 degrees north.163 With SAR-Lupe nearing the end of its service life, a 
follow-on system was developed to provide continuity in coverage. The new system, 
named SARah, is a series of three, active phased-array SAR satellites that are anticipated 
to provide greater resolution than the current system.164 SARah 1 is expected to be 
launched by a Space-X Falcon 9 rocket out of Vandenberg AFB, California in October 
2021.165 
Following the SAR-Lupe system, the Germans developed a dedicated 
MILSATCOM capability: the COMSATBw system. Launched in October 2009 and May 
2010, COMSATBw-1 and COMSATBw-2 are geostationary (i=.05 and .08) 
communications satellites providing both SHF (3-30 GHz) and UHF (300 MHz- 3GHz) 
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communication.166 The satellites are in orbital slots 63 degrees east and 13.2 degrees east, 
respectively.167 Airbus Defense and Space has been awarded the contract for on-orbit 
operation of the satellites and their associated systems through 2022, further describing 
their capability to provide “military UHF and X-band plus additional capacity in C and Ku-
band over a coverage stretching from the Americas to Eastern Asia.”168 The development 
and launch of these satellites, at the time, was a milestone for the German Bundeswehr, 
making them one of five militaries in Europe with a dedicated MILSAT capability.169 
2. France  
The French military’s space program traces its roots back to the mid-1980s and the 
conflict between Chad and Libya. Pressured to intervene in the conflict, based on what 
French military officers assessed as outdated intelligence, Laurence Nardon describes how 
this drove the “Prime Minister Laurent Fabius to create a high-level working group to 
assess the possibility of a French military space program.”170 The resultant report in 1986, 
Nardon states “identified space observation as one of the most effective means of gathering 
information” and, moreover, it “concluded that space observation was just as important for 
France’s strategic independence as was its nuclear force.”171 In 1992, the Direction du 
Renseignement Militaire (DRM) or French Military Intelligence Directorate was created,  
which Gosnold writes combined “the intelligence offices of the navy, army, air force and 
joint chiefs,” and was tasked “with collecting, analyzing and disseminating military 
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intelligence to the armed forces and political authorities.”172 Three years later, France 
launched its first two military and intelligence satellites Helios 1A and Cerise.173 Helios 
1A remained operational until 2012, when it was removed from service,174 and Cerise 
holds distinction as the first satellite to be damaged by space debris, one year after 
achieving orbit, further serving to highlight the importance of redundancy and resiliency 
in space systems.175  
Recognizing the changing strategic environment and the role of space, France 
released its first Space Defence Strategy in 2019 with the purpose, described by Arthur 
Laudrain, to help sustain strategic autonomy, improve space situational awareness (SSA) 
for decisionmakers, and “improve the protection of national and key European space 
assets.”176 Derived from the vision established in the Space Defence Strategy, France 
established its own Space Command, the Commandement de l’Espace (CDE) in September 
2019.177  The following September, the integrated French Air and Space Force (Armée de 
l’Air et de l’Espace) was established, replacing the French Air Force, and in a statement, 
the new Air and Space Force Chief of Staff Gen. Philippe Lavigne reasoned: “Today 
aviators must look higher, further, towards space, this new field of confrontation that is 
highly strategic and increasingly connected.”178 Murielle Delaporte argues that Paris is 
keeping with its “determination to, at a minimum, keep its [self-perceived] rank as the third 
international space power,” hosting its first ever multinational military space exercise, 
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ASTERX, with Germany, Italy, and the United States in March 2021.179 Similar to the 
shift in U.S. space policy toward allied cooperation in 2010, the French Space Defence 
Strategy notes that success of the strategy must be “backed up by an in-depth strategic and 
political dialogue with our European and transatlantic partners and closer cooperation with 
our allies.”180   
Reported by the French Office for Science and Technology, Centre National 
d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES) “is uniquely positioned to serve strategic military needs” as the 
French space agency and a technical authority.181 The CNES R&T program, under 
cognizance of the Armed Forces Ministry, helps to develop and improve dual-use earth 
observation and telecommunication technology, improving military benefits.182 CNES, 
through operation of the Ariane launch system, allows France and Europe to maintain an 
independent launch capability, as well housing the newly established CDE at the Toulouse 
Space Centre.183 The French CDE operates observation, SIGINT, and SATCOM assets to 
support French military and allied operations.184 This satellite infrastructure consists of: 
three earth observation systems: Helios 2, Pléiades, and CSO satellites; two SIGINT 
systems: ELISA and CERES; and the Syracuse III & IV SATCOM satellites.185  
Satellite observation systems, described by the French Space Defence Strategy, 
provide “non-intrusive intelligence gathering and support for operations and military 
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geography.”186 France began with the launch of the Helios program in 1995 with Helios 
1A and 1B, which have since been replaced by the second-generation Helios 2A and 2B, in 
2004 and 2009.187 Helios 2A operates in a sun-synchronous orbit at 700 km altitude, with 
two payloads, both an optical imager and infrared imager for nighttime detection.188 Helios 
2B is identical to Helios 2A. Providing a ground resolution of 35 cm, Helios 2B is located 
in the same near-polar sun-synchronous orbital plane, but separated within the orbit by 180 
degrees.189 Both satellites were multinational projects, including Belgium, Spain, Italy, 
and Greece, with further bilateral data-sharing agreements signed by Italy and Germany, 
in exchange for data from COSMO-SkyMed and the SAR-Lupe radar satellites.190  
France’s second satellite observation system, Pléiades, is a dual-use (Civil and 
Military) two-satellite system with the capability to provide greater than 500 images per 
day per satellite, in which CNES reports, “it is possible to obtain an image of any point on 
the planet in less than 24 hours.”191 Launched in 2011, and 2012, both satellites are in a 
sun-synchronous orbit at an altitude of 694 km, and provide high-resolution imagery (70 
cm) in both the visible and near infrared spectrum.192 Similar to the Helios program, 
Pléiades was part of a bilateral agreement with Italy, whereby, France developed and 
funded two optical satellites, Italy developed and funded four X-Band SAR satellites, and 
the ground segment would be shared amongst the two countries.193  
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France’s newest and most capable optical reconnaissance satellite, Composante 
Spatiale Optique (CSO), was developed within the framework of the multinational space-
based imaging system (MUSIS), between France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, and Greece in 
2008, with the Poles joining in 2010, and a separate bilateral agreement in 2011 with Italy to 
share CSO and COSMO-SkyMed (CSG) data.194 The system, when complete, will consist 
of three LEO satellites, with the first two launched in 2018, and 2020 respectively.195 CSO-
3 has yet to launch, with the launch date being pushed back until at least the second quarter 
of 2022, a result of the delay in the French Ariane 6 debut.196 The CSO constellation will 
differ from previous French systems, as Chris Gebhardt reports, it “will use two different 
orbital altitudes for the three satellites, with CSO-1 and -3 in 800 km Sun-synchronous orbits 
while CSO-2 goes into a much lower 480 km Sun-synchronous orbit,” which allows for 
reconnaissance operations and extremely-high-resolution imagery operations, 
respectively.197 The three satellites are identical, building on the capabilities of the Pléiades 
platform, with the greatest resolution images ever produced by a European satellite, which 
Spaceflight Now reports can achieve resolutions of 35 cm from the 800 km orbit, and better 
than 20 cm from 480 km altitude.198 Furthermore, touted by CNES, CSO has “an 
unprecedented capacity for autonomous orbit control on board for station keeping 
functions.”199 Airbus Defense and Space has designed and produced the satellites, and will 
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additionally be responsible for the operation of the ground segment as the prime 
contractor.200 
France is the only country in Europe to experiment with SIGINT detection, currently 
with the Electronic Intelligence Satellite (ELISA) demonstrator, and seeks to have a domestic 
capability using the future Capacité de Renseignement Electromagnétique Spatiale (CERES) 
satellites.201 ELISA is a four-microsatellite demonstration system launched in 2011 by the 
French Directorate General of Armament (DGA), testing technology to detect and precisely 
locate radar emissions.202 The constellation, located in LEO, is being used to develop the 
technology for the follow-on LEO constellation, CERES, expected to enter service in 
2021.203 CERES will use a constellation of three satellites in formation to combine signals 
and precisely locate the detected system.204 Dr. Thomas Withington of Armada International 
assessed that CERES will be capable of detecting and geolocating signals from 3 MHz to 3 
GHz and have further ELINT capabilities between 500 MHz and 40 GHz capable of 
measuring angle of arrival, pulse width, pulse repetition frequency (PRF), transmission 
frequency, and the radar’s scan rate.205  
The final group of military satellites developed by the French is the Syracuse III and 
IV SATCOM satellites.206 The first two satellites, Syracuse IIIA and IIIB were launched in 
2005 and 2006, respectively, with a design life of 12–15 years.207 There was originally 
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planned a third Syracuse III, but it was scrapped in favor of hosting the payload on Italy’s 
Sicral 2 satellite, completing the three-satellite Syracuse III constellation.208 Syracuse IIIA 
and IIIB are in geostationary orbits, in slots 47 degrees east and 5 degrees west, providing 
France and allies coverage from the eastern United States to Asia. However, the constellation 
does not cover the Pacific Ocean.209 The Syracuse IIIC payload, hosted on Sicral 2, is in a 
geostationary slot 37 degrees east, over eastern Africa, providing further regional 
coverage.210 The Syracuse system operates in both SHF and EHF bands, and uses internet 
protocol (IP) for its communications, which is assessed by Jane’s International Defence 
Review to “transmit at data rates of up to 400 Mbps in one theatre while maintaining a parallel 
rate of 70 Mbps in a second theatre, plus other slower communications links.”211 As part of 
a NATO memorandum of understanding, France, Britain, and Italy agreed to provide 
SATCOM services for NATO forces from 2005–19, under the NATO SATCOM Post-2000 
(NSP2K) program.212 France’s Syracuse III was under contract to provide 45% of secure 
SHF (7-8 GHz) SATCOM, while Italy’s Sicral 1 and the British Skynet 4 and 5 would 
provide ad ditional UHF (300 MHz) and SHF services.213 France, especially the French 
Navy, began to feel limited in terms of bandwidth, as new technology drove performance 
requirements and concerns about the harsh operational environment resulted in the contract 
and development for a transition from Syracuse III to Syracuse IV expected in 2023.214 
CNES proposes that the new geostationary system will have upgraded resistance to jamming, 
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more flexibility in its performance, and larger frequency bands (Band X: 8 -12.5 GHz, and 
Ka band: 26.5 - 40 GHz) to better support the armed forces.215 
3. United Kingdom  
The United Kingdom was the world’s third space-faring nation; however, in the last 
50 or so years it is unlikely that anyone would still describe the UK as a truly global space 
power, nor have they launched a satellite independently since 1971.216 The British, do 
however, have a strong and rapidly growing commercial sector,217 and hold the claim of 
being the first nation to successfully deploy a geostationary (GEO) military communications 
satellite, with Skynet 1 in 1969.218 In recent years, the United Kingdom has begun ramping 
up its defense spending. As proclaimed by British Prime Minister Boris Johnson: “The 
international situation is more perilous and more intensely competitive than at any time since 
the Cold War, and Britain must be true to our history and stand alongside our allies.”219 The 
new defense initiative Johnson announced costs 16.5 billion euros ($22 billion) and will fund 
a series of future warfare programs, which will include a new Space Command capable of 
launching the UK’s own rocket by 2022. As described by Dr. Bleddyn Bowen of Kings 
College, the overall “British interest in military spacepower is ‘better late than never’,” and 
as a space power it “sits between its military and intelligence integration with the United 
States and Five Eyes …, and industrial and scientific space integration with Europe at both 
the European Space Agency (ESA) and the European Union (EU).”220 
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The newly designated UK Space Command is a joint command which will build 
upon the existing Royal Airforce (RAF) space organization, and when fully operational will 
have responsibility and command and control (C2) over all UK space capabilities.221 
Working closely with the Space Command is the Ministry of Defense (MOD) Space 
Directorate, which according to the MOD is responsible for UK “Defence Space policy, 
strategy and cross-government and international coordination.”222 Authority and direction 
will flow from the National Space Council through the Directorate to Space Command, 
which will delegate to subordinate command elements.223 Furthermore, the MOD notes that, 
as necessary, Space Command will interface with the UK Space Agency “to deliver joint 
national space capability.”224 
The British have only one major space system on orbit, that provides SATCOM 
services to the British Armed Forces. As previously mentioned, this system is the Skynet 
family of satellites, first launched in 1969. Described by Bowen, this “sovereign Skynet 
military and intelligence satellite” supports the British military, yet its daily operations are 
“outsourced to Airbus.”225 At the time of this writing, eight of these satellites remain on 
orbit, consisting of both Skynet 4 and 5 series. Skynet 4C, has drifted into an inclined orbit 
(13.221 degrees) and is used to provide a few hours coverage daily to British and American 
Antarctic operations.226 Three Skynet 4, improved stage two satellites remain operational, 
detailed by Keith Mitchell as having “nuclear hardening, anti-jamming countermeasures, and 
 
221 “Guidance: UK Space Command,” UK Ministry of Defense, April 1, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/
guidance/uk-space-command. 
222 UK Ministry of Defense. 
223 UK Ministry of Defense. 
224 UK Ministry of Defense. 
225 Bowen, The Integrated Review and UK Spacepower: The Search for Strategy, 4. 
226 Jonathan Amos, “UK’s Skynet Military Satellite Launched,” BBC News, December 19, 2012, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-20781625; UK Space Agency, UK Registry of Outer 




laser protection.”227 The newest generation, Skynet 5, was launched between 2007–2012, 
Skynet 5A-5D.228 These satellites provide military users X-band and UHF capacity, with 
both regional coverage and steerable spot beams.229 Airbus has marketed these satellites as 
“Fully interoperable with WGS X-band terminals.”230 Furthermore, the system is capable of 
offering “5 UHF channels that are fully coordinated with NATO standards to ensure usability 
and interoperability.”231 Responding to the growing demand and acknowledgment of future 
needs, the British MOD signed a 500 million euro contract with Airbus Defense and Space 
in 2020 to develop a follow-on system extending the Skynet family, starting with Skynet 6A, 
expected to launch in 2025 with a 15-year design life.232 
In addition to the Skynet communication satellites, the MOD has funded and 
participated in two development programs for optical reconnaissance satellites: Carbonite 2 
and TopSat 1.233 Both programs are being coordinated with the UK Space Agency to 
demonstrate a commercial capability for Earth Observation (EO) that could provide military 
application. C4ISRNET reports that the British MOD invested 4 million euros ($5 million) 
in the program to test “the capabilities of the system to provide reconnaissance video and 
still imagery.”234 Describing Carbonite 2, British MOD Chief Scientific Advisor Hugh 
Durrant-Whyte stated: “this is an excellent example of defence science and technology 
working with industry and the Royal Air Force to deliver affordable and pioneering space 
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technology quickly for our Armed Forces.”235 The TopSat, program, similar to Carbonite, 
was outlined by ESA Earth Observation portal as a demonstration, testing “the capabilities 
of small spacecraft on a high-resolution imaging mission, including an end-to-end ground 
segment with services for a commercial user community” by which “the data is also being 
used by institutional users (government agencies, military, etc.).”236 Both programs show 
the British MOD’s political will and desire to continue investing in and to advance space 
technologies.  
C. IMPACT ON NAVAL MISSIONS 
With the discussion of select American allies’ military space programs and 
capabilities conducted in the previous section, this section turns toward their utility and 
application on maritime operations concerning communications, MDA, and METOC. 
Specifically, how can an allied space coalition including Germany, France, and the UK assist 
U.S. naval operations countering maritime terrorism, illegal immigration, and expanded 
Russian naval operations as described in the beginning of the chapter? In keeping with the 
scope of this thesis, discussion is constrained to maritime operations, although, many of the 
systems lend themselves to joint operations.  
1. Communications  
Considering the applicability of European space systems on communications and 
U.S. naval operations throughout Europe, there are three benefits to be had: interoperability, 
resilience, and improved bandwidth. In strategic terms, presented in the Tri-Service Maritime 
Strategy, interoperability is vital; enables “the development of combined warfighting 
concepts to counter malign activities, uphold international norms, and contribute to 
deterrence.”237 In Europe, this means improving integration with NATO forces to conduct 
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exercises and security operations, such as Operation Sea Guardian or Operation Sophia, as 
part of a larger deterrence campaign focused on Russia. Discussed in Chapter II, 
communication enables naval forces to transmit orders, direct movement of forces, and 
coordinate efforts. This enabling capability is precisely what Russian maritime doctrine seeks 
to disrupt throughout the European AO, with the intent to create a contested, degraded, and 
operationally limited (CDO) environment. Therein lies the necessity for, and benefit 
generated from increasing the resiliency of satellite communications. Moreover, adding more 
satellites to the overall combined force architecture will not only generate resiliency, but will 
offer opportunities for increased capacity and bandwidth available to the U.S. Navy (USN).  
France’s Syracuse system and the UK’s Skynet system are NATO compatible, and 
the newest generation Skynet 5 is further marketed as being fully interoperable with the U.S. 
WGS X-Band terminals. This inherent interoperability amongst allied naval forces will help 
to ensure uninterrupted communication during exercises and maritime security operations 
(MSO). Removing the hurdle of interoperability through NATO compatibility and terminal 
compatibility with U.S. systems serves to provide the USN an option for greater flexibility 
and ease of access to allied communication networks with coverage throughout the 
Mediterranean.  
Partnership with Germany, France, and the UK can further provide the USN 
resiliency in terms of European SATCOM coverage. An Air Force Space Command white 
paper proposes that resiliency is both a function of disaggregation and hardening of the 
system itself, which “is of value whether the threat is a hostile adversary, or an environmental 
threat, such as orbital debris.”238  Increasing the pool of satellites used to provide naval 
SATCOM services will inherently increase the disaggregation of assets, generating greater 
resiliency. Resiliency, in terms of hardened systems, can also result from allied cooperation.  
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The U.S. has increasingly relied upon commercial high-throughput satellite (HTS) 
networks over the last two decades to meet U.S. DOD communication needs.239 In 2013, a 
Defense Business Board (DBB) report found that DOD SATCOM services were comprised 
of 40% commercial SATCOM, costing $640 million per year, a trend that was “expected to 
escalate dramatically in the near future.”240 While reducing cost is important, the 
vulnerability created by this demand for non-military COMSAT systems is more concerning. 
That same year, MILSAT systems could not meet the communication needs of U.S. Africa 
Command, which turned to the commercial sector, signing a one-year $10 million deal 
leasing an Apstar-7 satellite from a Chinese firm, creating a possible security risk.241 
Granted, this happened to a COCOM, yet the lesson applies all the same to naval forces at 
large and would hold true during increased maritime demand throughout the Mediterranean. 
Allied MILSATCOM is an alternative to commercial options that allow for security and 
resilience. COMSATBw, Syracuse, and Skynet satellites offer anti-jam, anti-laser, and 
electronically hardened MILSATCOM coverage options to achieve mission assurance for 
maritime forces in a European CDO environment. 
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense & Global 
Security expands on the concept of network resiliency, further proposing the concept of 
Space Domain Mission Assurance, which is achieved through defensive operations, 
reconstitution, and resilience.242 Coordination with European allies will help provide for two 
of the three components: resilience, as discussed previously, and reconstitution. The Center 
for Strategic and International Studies reported a shortfall in U.S. operational SATCOM 
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systems, in that the average age as of FY2019 was just shy of 12 years.243  Replacing the 
aging on-orbit SATCOM systems are two scheduled projects: Protected Tactical Satellite 
Communications (PTS) and Evolved Strategic Satellite Communications (ESS).244 Neither 
system is expected to be operational until the mid-to-late 2020s. Interoperable European 
SATCOM systems, on the other hand,  can provide the Navy with SATCOM service 
coverage in Europe should domestic systems begin to fail, and will assist in solving the 
challenge of reconstitution as our allies continue expanding and launching their own 
SATCOM networks, ultimately begetting mission assurance.  
In addition to mission assurance and resiliency, allied SATCOM provides an 
opportunity for increased bandwidth. Stated above, U.S. DOD demand for SATCOM 
services has been growing rapidly, and military systems cannot meet the demand. The USN 
is no exception from this trend. By leveraging allied systems, the USN can increase available 
channels and throughput to ships at sea in the Mediterranean. Skynet 5, for example, is 
reported by Airbus (formerly EADS Astrium) to have five MILSAT UHF channels available 
for mobile voice and data needs.245 In 2008, the U.S. contracted with Paradigm (EADS 
Astrium) to purchase one 155 Mbps by 8 Mbps link— the excess capacity that was unused 
by the UK MOD.246 Syracuse IV, reported by SpaceNews, is expected on orbit in 2022 and 
will “offer X-band, military Ka-band and X/Ka dual-band mode services for allied 
governments at speeds of up to several hundred megabits per second.”247 The new Syracuse 
satellites will only further deepen the well of available bandwidth and communications 
available to support European maritime operations. Finally, while the German COMSATBw 
system does not currently report any excess capacity on its two satellites, it can be expected 
that any future cooperation and inclusion of Germany in an allied space coalition would allow 
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for relative ease of integration considering that COMSATBw, like the Syracuse systems and 
the previously contracted Skynet, are all operated by Airbus Defence and Space.248 
2. Maritime Domain Awareness 
European Earth Observation systems can provide utility to U.S. Sixth Fleet, reducing 
operational resource constraints and supporting NATO efforts, for example, as part of 
Operation Sophia or countering the Russian submarine fleet. These systems help build the 
recognized maritime picture (RMP) essential to MDA. European COMSAT systems, 
discussed above, also allow the USN to achieve greater resiliency and capacity of 
communications throughout Europe, which will promote MDA. As Ajey Lele states, 
“Satellites allow real-time communication which is essential for ship and cargo surveillance, 
or vessel monitoring.”249 Cooperation with European allies will enhance the command-and-
control function required for MDA to be successful. 
Communication aside, both active and passive satellite systems enhance maritime 
surveillance. Lele proposes that “For the purpose of better time and spatial coverage, the best 
option presently available is the use of space sensors, which are capable of providing global 
coverage.”250 While true that global coverage is achieved due to the nature of orbits, this 
chapter is concerned with application of European SIGINT, SAR, and EO/IR systems on 
MDA in the Mediterranean and Arctic. To this end, of the three allies examined, France and 
Germany have the market share of Earth Observation systems. France has the largest number 
of available satellites that can contribute to the mission; however, Germany has a series of 
extremely high resolution and highly regarded SAR satellites. 
Werner Fasslabend, president of the Austrian Institute for European and Security 
Policy (AIES), articulates in a Space Policy article that “threats no longer come only from 
an armed attack by another state; rather the current concept of ‘functional security’ includes 
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threats to the economy, such as the threat posed by piracy to the world’s traffic.”251 
Mentioned previously, a RAND study advocates that in the Mediterranean one of the greatest 
challenges is migration.252 While not entirely similar, piracy, human trafficking, and migrant 
smuggling activities trend together, which are combated under UNSCR enforcement and 
NATO cooperation with Operation Sophia, intended to repress transnational criminality.253 
As these transnational challenges continue to grow, space-based sensors can achieve a high 
impact on naval operations and MDA. Nardon and Venet find that “EO satellites can detect 
threats in the high seas, including piracy and terrorist activities”; traditionally, however, 
satellites can have a “mixed record of detecting ships” on account of lower resolution and 
poor revisit times.254 This has resulted in a need for additional surveillance tools, such as 
maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or coastal systems.255 In 
this instance satellites from both France and Germany can reduce the need for USN P-3/P-8 
aircraft or surface vessels to be used for the ISR mission. France’s Helios 2A/2B, Pléiades 
1A/1B, and CSO satellites, with the German SAR-Lupe constellation, offer an opportunity 
for 12 high-resolution LEO satellites to support Mediterranean and Arctic MDA. With a 
larger constellation, greater revisit times can be achieved, nullifying the concerns raised by 
Nardon and Venet. Moreover, both Helios and SAR-Lupe are equipped with infrared 
sensors, with Pléiades operating in near IR (subregion of IR spectrum), allowing for 
continued detection and vessel tracking during inclement weather and at night. 
Dr. Steven Goff points out in a USNI article that the Coast Guard, the U.S.’s primary 
maritime presence in the polar regions, only has two icebreakers (nearing end of lifetime) 
and that an investment in space-based capabilities could assist in the goal of “ensuring a safe, 
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secure, and cooperative Arctic region.”256 Naval operations in the Arctic have also begun to 
increase, such as the 2020 Barents Sea patrol, which Bryan Clark describes as “an area where 
Russian submarines like to operate, and we’ve kind of left the area alone for so long that it’s 
become an extension of the areas they deploy that they [the Russians] see as their bastion.”257 
Russian submarine patrols jumped 50% from 2013 to 2014, and by 2017 had reached levels 
unseen since the Cold War.258 The high-resolution EO/IR satellites of France, and especially 
the SAR satellites of Germany, can be used to detect surfaced submarines; observe 
operational changes at submarine bases, improving understanding of deployment patterns 
and notification of submarines getting underway; and possibly detect a submarine wake as 
proposed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative.259 French observation satellites are all highly 
inclined, with near polar orbits, meaning they will provide coverage in the Arctic as well as 
the Mediterranean. Germany’s SAR-Lupe system is slightly less inclined, yet still provides 
coverage from 80 degrees South to 80 degrees North, including coverage of the Barents Sea. 
Finally, France’s investment in the ELISA demonstrator and future CERES systems 
will provide further benefit to allied naval operations. These systems can assist the MDA 
mission by detecting and locating radar emissions through geolocation. Not only will this 
help commanders to understand where ships are in the environment but, through signal 
processing, commanders will gain a better understanding of what the ship is or is not. ELINT 
in conjunction with EO imagery will help to locate and identify smuggling vessels, or locate 
and track specific Russian submarines, entirely based on signal transmission.  
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3. Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations 
None of the European countries discussed have dedicated military METOC satellites. 
While allied contributions to naval operations lie more firmly in communication or MDA, 
this is not to say they cannot have an impact on the METOC mission. Don Conlee and 
Richard Crout, at an American Meteorological Society conference, described how “synthetic 
aperture radar (SAR) imagery is extensively used [by the Naval Oceanographic Office 
(NAVO)] in the production of sea ice analyses in U.S. waters and the Arctic.”260  Through 
the use of SAR, NAVO can determine ice edge, ice coverage, and ice concentration in all 
weather conditions, day or night, an arrangement already shown successful through a 
partnership with Canada and its RADARSAT-1 system.261 Germany’s SAR-Lupe can play 
the same role, providing additional data to NAVO and Navy METOC forecasters supporting 
the fleet. 
Ajey Lele discusses in Space and Maritime Security, how “[SAR] images have been 
used for applications such as wave and wind retrievals, ship detection, monitoring of sea ice, 
as well as the interpretation of signatures of surface current gradients over oceanic fronts, 
internal waves, and shallow-water bathymetry.”262 SAR data, through interpretation by 
NAVO and METOC cells, provides a huge advantage to naval forces, specifically in the 
Arctic. Satellite navigation through GNSS systems in the Arctic can be limited, a result of 
orbital inclination limitations on trilateration, and the higher ionospheric activity effect on 
signal scintillation.263 With safety of navigation an increased concern, understanding and 
predicting wind and weather patterns, in addition to changing sea ice conditions, becomes of 
vital importance for naval operations. Nowhere is oceanographic and bathymetry data more 
important than when considering Russian submarine activity. Anti-submarine warfare 
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(ASW) planners rely upon this data for sensor and weapon system performance 
predictions.264 Considering that Russian doctrine relies heavily upon its submarine force, 
the impact of SAR-generated data for ASW becomes fairly clear.  
D. ALLIANCE STRUCTURE COMPARISON 
Section D provides a brief discussion of the three proposed structures for an allied 
space coalition— bilateral, regional, or global. Moreover, evidence specific to the European 
countries and how they would impact the three structures is presented. No policy 
recommendations or conclusions as to the structure for an allied space coalition are offered, 
as they will be discussed in Chapter V, following the second case study analysis of Asian 
allies and the influence of China in the broader great power competition. 
Historically, U.S. alliances in Europe have been regional or multi-national in nature, 
emerging from the second World War, with NATO as the standard model.265 However, Goh 
et al. have identified that there appears to be a divergence from the traditional model, noting 
the “ongoing rift between the United States and Europe,” where Germany specifically “is 
more concerned with the future of the regional order in Europe,” as is France, but both 
hesitate to take the lead in the “post-Atlantic era.”266 Louis Simón, and colleagues have 
tackled a similar issue, finding that “The regional alliance system [NATO] lost its original 
sense of purpose and has experienced greater fragmentation.”267 They found that European 
states began entering smaller bilateral or minilateral agreements that are threat focused, with 
Eastern and Northern European states concerned with Russia, and the Southern and Western 
European states struggling with regional instability or terrorism.268 
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In a sense, multiple bilateral or smaller minilateral space agreements as described in 
“Nodal defence: the changing structure of U.S. alliance systems in Europe and East Asia,” 
would be in keeping with the current trend toward alliance fragmentation in Europe, and 
likely represents the easiest avenue toward allied space cooperation, as it allows agreements 
to be tailored specifically to the particular allied nations’ interests. There would be no need 
to account for political differences amongst coalition nations as has been seen in the past, 
upending cooperation. The International Institute for Strategic Studies contends, “European 
military space cooperation has been hindered by disputes over cross-financing and national 
industrial shares, as well by the high costs involved.”269 The 1998 failure of the Trimilsat 
project, a joint effort between the British, French, and Germans is a prime example, with the 
UK withdrawing from the project for those exact reasons.270 
The United States Navy could provide our European allies, individually, the benefits 
of an alliance, overcoming hurdles that might have hindered cooperation in a more expansive 
structure. Gentoku Toyoma proposes that “making use of allies’ space capabilities can reduce 
costs,” and “make it less necessary for the United States to build complex space systems 
because it could employ allies’ capabilities.”271 These same benefits of cost saving, and 
mutual use of capabilities would apply equally, providing additional capability to allies. 
Furthermore, the Navy, at least when considering operational and tactical uses of allied 
systems, should not see any loss in terms of added throughput, capabilities, or space-derived 
data resulting from allied systems, with the assumption that the total number of allies remains 
the same. 
While bilateral agreements are simpler in terms of political hurdles, and in terms of 
data sharing agreements, they would present a number of significant drawbacks. Two major 
strategic benefits sought through allied space cooperation are resiliency and deterrence. 
Minimizing the participants in an allied space structure would significantly reduce 
disaggregation, distribution, and diversification, which the Office of Assistant Secretary of 
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Defense Homeland Defense & Global Security keys in on as critical components of space 
system resilience.272 The United States, as the central node in a series of multilateral 
agreements may retain, to an extent, some aspects of disaggregation, distribution, and 
diversification. But it will definitely weaken the individual allied navies, which are critical 
to countering the overall challenges of Europe highlighted in the opening section of the 
chapter. In regard to the issue of deterrence, without a diversity of nations in the alliance 
driving up the potential cost of adversary aggression, a satellite or constellation, once seen 
as an unappealing target, no longer holds such a large opportunity cost when operating in a 
limited bilateral structure.273 
Erring on the side of status quo, the U.S. could maintain its historical alliance posture 
in Europe and drive toward a regional allied space coalition. Of course, regional cooperation 
in Europe is the standard, emerging from joint efforts of European nations, and their 
transnational agencies such as the EU and ESA. The USN would benefit from being able to 
draw upon the diverse capabilities each nation brings to the coalition. The evidence from 
section B, would support this approach. Many of the European space programs themselves 
are intertwined throughout the region, not to mention combined funding, development, and 
tasking of the various satellite systems. The European Parliament think tank produced an 
analysis of the European space sector, with the finding that “Space cooperation in Europe 
therefore represents a mix of supranational and intergovernmental actors and structures.”274 
For example, from the beginning, France’s Helios program was developed and funded jointly 
by France, Italy, and Spain with a scheme for independent tasking, yet by the early 2000s 
Helios received nearly 20% joint tasking.275 With the supranational and intergovernmental 
nature of the European space sector, a Strategic Comments article presented the case for a 
“joint transatlantic intelligence network,” proposing that “NATO standardization agreements 
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on technical formats and interfaces for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) 
data exchange” be used as a model.276  
Naturally, for the United States, following established NATO standards when 
structuring a regionally allied space coalition would be of great benefit. Military to military 
space cooperation in Europe, and the requisite interoperability is already in place, the United 
States would simply need to “plug in” to the network and formalize the alliance structure. 
Moreover, by following the NATO standard and building on the military-to-military 
cooperation already in place, expansion of a regional space coalition structure beyond 
Germany, France, and the UK would be fairly straightforward. The NATO SATCOM Post-
2000 (NSP2K) program is one successful example of this, operating under a Memorandum 
of Understanding, France, Italy, and Britain provided SATCOM services to NATO from 
2000 to 2019.277  In this form of alliance, naval units at sea would retain all the benefits 
discussed through section C. Additionally, the downside of losing the deterrence factor, a 
result of segregating the alliance into bilateral agreements, becomes null and void. Joining 
the capabilities and military constellations of Germany, France, and the UK will inherently 
increase the opportunity cost and complicate Russian analysis when considering 
counterspace or ASAT actions to thwart allied efforts.  
Of course, no form of allied space coalition is perfect, and a regional structure is no 
exception, it too will have obstacles to overcome should cooperation persist. Rivalries and 
political friction amongst member nations can be expected. Additionally, the issue of trust 
must be considered. How will allies know if the others are sharing space-based asset 
information in return for their own? In this instance, the friction can be seen between the EU 
and the British. As the leading EU spacefaring nation, French space policy appears to favor 
regional cooperation, stating: “Our interests are not limited to French military satellites but 
may include French commercial satellites, some allied satellites and EU satellites.”278  
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However, the UK on the other hand, following Brexit may not share this sentiment. Bleddyn 
Bowen analyzed the rise of EU hard power and their delving into the space domain, finding 
that the “UK may seek to reduce its dependency on the other [EU] through the pursuit of new 
defence assets in space,” thereby complicating a regional alliance and perhaps requiring 
individual bilateral agreements with Britain and France.279 
In considering allied space cooperation on the global scale, the fundamentals of the 
structure are hardly divergent from a regional coalition. The benefits and challenges are 
similar in context, if not scope. The operational benefits of a regional alliance versus global 
will only expand as more sensors, data sources, and additional bandwidth become available. 
Likewise, the factors of deterrence and resiliency, will grow as member states are added to 
the space coalition. As such, to truly understand and address the difference when considering 
European allies, between a regionally defined space coalition and a global one, the political 
will of the three allied countries comes to the front. Of the European allies examined, 
Germany presents itself as the most regionally focused of the three, with both the UK and 
France seemingly open to a broader coalition.  
Germany, at first appears to have a very Europe-first approach to space, which could 
heavily favor remaining in a regional structure. A case can be made, however, that Germany 
would support a larger, even global, allied space coalition under the right circumstances. The 
German space strategy recognizes that they are a “knowledge society” and that for a “country 
short of raw materials such as Germany, [knowledge] is a strategic resource.”280 Space-
based sensors are a key component to harnessing and transmitting this resource anywhere on 
the globe. Germany’s space strategy addresses the modern military reliance upon satellites, 
acknowledging their vital role in allowing Germany “to continue to contribute to 
international peacekeeping missions and play its proper role in global politics.”281 This 
“proper role” would seem to suggest that Germany is open to the possible expansion of space 
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cooperation beyond Europe and its heavy involvement in ESA. It recognizes that in 
confronting the rising global challenges, it is necessary to have a coordinated effort, joining 
with allies and partners in a “networked security” approach.282 However, stemming from a 
very utilitarian mindset, a great emphasis would need to be placed on efficiency of spending 
and development of space networks, as the German space strategy emphasizes “avoidance 
of duplicate activities and structures” in recognizing constrained budgets.283 In approaching 
allied space cooperation with Germany, especially in a global structure, it will be important 
to remain cognizant that innovation and technology development in the German space sector 
is not driven by or ultimately prioritized under their military, as it is in the United States, but 
rather their commercial and civil science sectors.284 
France’s 2019 Space Defence Strategy, when compared to Germany’s, appears to 
look favorably upon a more global posture, recognizing the threat to its overseas territories 
in the Pacific, and Indian Oceans, a result of “changing strategic dynamics” in Asia, Russian 
moves to “rebuild a zone of influence” in the Mediterranean, and possible conflict in the 
Arctic, arguing that “space will continue to be one of the cornerstones of our operational 
capabilities, whether for the purposes of deterrence, support to operations or active space 
defence.”285 France’s cooperation, while European heavy in the short term, is proposed to 
expand into the Indo-Pacific with potential partners and allies such as India, Japan, and 
Australia.286 Yet, while cooperation appears favorable, it is not necessarily assured. French 
authorities have expressed concern, as Sylvie Matelly explains, regarding the prospect of 
“weakening France’s strategic autonomy by increasing its already considerable defense 
dependence on U.S. technologies and capabilities.”287 She also comments that France would 
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find itself disadvantaged strategically and shorthanded technologically if it fails to expand 
cooperation with the United States.288 Matelly concludes that any space cooperation with 
France will need to find the right balance, allowing for continued French strategic 
independence, while allowing for the benefit of partnership with American technology and 
industry.289 While not specific in nature to a global space coalition structure, any expansion 
of the current French space cooperation, led by the United States and the Navy, could trigger 
concerns of France’s loss of strategic autonomy concerning space. 
Britain’s evolving national space culture presents an opportunity for allied 
cooperation in all forms. The United Kingdom has turned around its space program in terms 
of spending and international engagement over the past decade. It has recognized many of 
its own shortcomings, especially its inability for self-reliance in space, highlighted by its 
Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, which states: “The 
UK nevertheless relies heavily on our allies for access to critical capabilities, such as satellite 
launch.”290 Moreover, rather than simply recognizing its reliance, the UK appears to 
embrace it and seek to enhance cooperation with allies. With the U.S. Space Command 
having recently taken over Operation Olympic Defender, a U.S. Strategic Command mission 
to further allied space cooperation and deterrence, the British were the first to join the 
coalition, assigning personnel to Vandenberg Air Force Base’s Combined Space Operations 
Center.291 In further acknowledgment of support for global operations, confirmed by Airbus, 
the UK moved the Skynet 5A satellite from 6° East to 95° East, a 67,000 km relocation 
placing the asset over Southeast Asia, reported to “provide protected and secure military 
satellite communications (Milsatcom) services to allied governments in the Asia-Pacific 
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region.”292 This shift can be seen to highlight the British concern and global outlook, similar 
to that of France, about continued Chinese expansion in the Indo-Pacific and its challenges 
to the international rules-based order.  
In concluding the case study of European allies, and the impact of Russia and its 
continued incursion throughout the Mediterranean and Arctic, the following chapter shifts 
its focus Eastward to Asia. Chapter IV will follow a similar format as the preceding chapter, 
however, addressing the growing Chinese influence in Southeast Asia and the Koreas. The 
challenges faced by naval forces, and the impact of space-based assets on communications, 
MDA, and METOC will again be discussed from the perspective of Japan, Korea, and 
Australia. As was done above, the three proposed alliance structures are examined based on 
their prospective merit given the politics and context of the Indo-Pacific theatre. With both 
the European and Asian case studies complete at the end of Chapter IV, the concluding 
chapter will lay out policy recommendations and the best structural alliance for an allied 
space coalition given the perspectives, capabilities, and politics of the chosen American 
allies, and their role in the greater strategic context of global great power competition with 
Russia and China. 
 




IV. BUILDING AN ASIAN NETWORK TO SUPPORT NAVAL 
OPERATIONS 
This chapter follows a similar thread as the last. Whereas Chapter III conducted a 
case-study analysis of Europe, Chapter IV examines the strategic maritime challenges in 
the Indo-Pacific, centered on great power competition with China and expanding Chinese 
influence. Thus, this chapter addresses allied cooperation and possible contributions to a 
space coalition among American Indo-Pacific allies: Japan, Australia, and South Korea. 
Section C examines how allied satellite systems could be leveraged to improve naval 
operations throughout Asia. The chapter concludes, in section D, with a discussion of the 
proposed space alliance structures. 
A. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE 
The Indo-Pacific region is of vital economic and geopolitical interest to the United 
States government and its armed forces. Reaffirmed by both the National Security Strategy 
and National Defense Strategy, the region constitutes the DOD’s priority theater.293 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Randal Schriver stated 
that for the past 70 years the robust U.S. military presence in the region allowed for greater 
security and stability, enabling strong economic development.294 Capitalizing on this 
stability, the Indo-Pacific nations built up their “Blue Economy,”  participating in shipping, 
offshore hydrocarbons, coastal tourism, fisheries, and aquaculture.295 The Indo-Pacific 
now generates $1.9 trillion in two-way trade for the United States,296 which as Schriver 
puts it, “leads to a strong economy that protects the American people, supports our way of 
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life, and sustains U.S. power.”297 Moreover, the U.S. maintains close security ties 
throughout the region; it is party to five formal defense agreements with Japan, South 
Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia.298 U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy promotes 
allied and partner nation cooperation to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific, while 
preserving a rules-based international order and advancing a shared vision.299 However, 
having risen in influence and regional control over the last two decades, China seeks to 
advance its own agenda within this new global center of gravity through territorial and 
maritime revisionism, further generating instability and regional friction.300 
1. South China Sea and Taiwan 
Naval operations and security concerns of the U.S. and its allies span the breadth 
of the Western Pacific, challenged by an authoritarian North Korean regime in the seas 
surrounding the Korean Peninsula, to direct strategic competition with China and concerns 
over access to the global commons in the South and East China Seas. The U.S. maintains 
83,500 servicemembers forward deployed across South Korea and Japan to confront 
regional and global challenges, and strengthen bilateral cooperation.301 However, the 
major strategic focus of U.S. efforts in the context of great power competition with China 
lies to the south, centered on the South China Sea (SCS) and Taiwan. For this reason, the 
proceeding chapter will focus its efforts on examining the impact of cooperation on these 
two parallel levers of strategic influence. 
No region in the Indo-Pacific features greater sovereignty disputes or strategic sway 
than has emerged amidst the SCS. As highlighted in the second chapter, the SCS is central 
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to the Chinese economy and national interests, naturally placing the maritime realm front 
and center. A 2017 RAND study asserts that the SCS has become “the unanticipated focal 
point of U.S.-Chinese geostrategic rivalry.”302 Marvin Ott contends the most important 
issue at stake in the SCS is that of respect for a “regional ‘rules-based’ order supported by 
U.S. power.”303 In short, continued Chinese territorial expansion and disrespect for 
international law threaten the global commons. The DOD holds the SCS and greater Indo-
Pacific as the “single most consequential region for America’s future.”304 Maintaining 
freedom of access and freedom of operations for the U.S. Navy throughout the SCS is key 
to maintaining the global commons; Allies will be more important than ever when facing 
this challenge. 
Addressing key shipping lanes, the DOD notes that “[e]ight of the world’s 10 
busiest container ports are in the Asia-Pacific region” and, annually, nearly 30 percent of 
maritime shipping passes through the SCS— over $1 trillion in American commerce.305 
Furthermore, as of 2014, the Strait of Malacca transports over 15 million barrels of oil 
daily, with an estimated two-thirds of total global oil shipments passing through the 
region.306 In addition to economic and energy security concerns, security interests are 
influenced by the twelve major cable systems routed through the South China Sea, 
connecting Asia to the Middle East, Europe, and America.307 In a report to Congress, 
Admiral Davidson describes how submarine cables “carry an estimated 95–99% of data, 
worldwide, which supports global commerce, banking, telecommunications, and 
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more.”308 These cables present a vulnerability, running near Chinese military outposts in 
the Spratly Islands, with many of the cables maintaining terrestrial cable landing points in 
mainland China.309 Admiral Davidson notes that global financial and business centers 
would see massive interruption in data flows should the cables be disturbed.310 However, 
more concerning is the fact that the interception of data or full outage could also impact 
the U.S. military, in which the Admiral stated: “[T]he military uses some of these same 
carrier systems. While we have backup systems available, the impacts to efficient and 
timely decision making would likely be severe.”311 
Eli Huang argues that “China’s cable strategy holds serious security implications 
for the U.S., Taiwan and the Asia–Pacific community.”312 Beijing’s military and Ministry 
of Information have developed their submarine cable technology since the 1990s, and have 
recently taken advantage of the advances by installing optical cable systems on Fiery Cross 
Reef, Subi Reef and Mischief Reef (Spratly Islands), greatly enhancing South China Sea 
command and control.313 Undersea cables are part of Beijing’s regional strategy, both by 
focusing on maintaining its media influence and psychological operations, crucial to the 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and by creating an underwater sensor and cable network 
for anti-submarine warfare—an “underwater great wall.”314 
While it is well understood that the SCS is the central focal point of the region for 
the U.S., Taiwan remains of major strategic importance. Many top analysts suspect a 
breakdown in cross-strait relations could lead a U.S.-China confrontation.315 Lindsay 
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Maizland writes “the PLA has made preparing for Taiwan contingency [sic] one of its top 
priorities, and Taiwan has been a major catalyst for China’s military modernization.”316 
Remaining as the last major historical territory of China, separated from the mainland’s 
rule, Taiwan is a constant reminder of China’s “century of humiliation,” in which the great 
empire was forced to surrender territory.317 This reminder, argues Maizland, has forced 
Chinese President Xi Jinping to the belief that “unification with Taiwan is essential to 
achieving what he calls the Chinese Dream, which sees China’s great-power status restored 
by 2049.”318 
In 1954, nearly coming to the brink of nuclear war, the U.S. began its defense 
relationship with Taiwan by signing a mutual defense treaty.319 The treaty was dissolved, 
however, in 1980, and replaced by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), after which, argues 
Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “the security relationship between the United States and 
Taiwan consequently turned into a unique – and unofficial – one.”320 The TRA states that 
the U.S. considers “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful 
means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the 
Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.”321 This is the situation 
we find ourselves in today, as described by Doug Bandow—an era of “strategic 
ambiguity.”322 
Highlighted recently in auto manufacturing shortages, Taiwan has an impressive 
technological base and is recognized as the world’s top manufacturer of semiconductor 
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chips.323 If China were to cut off Taiwan, it could stem the flow of oil to U.S. allies, take 
charge of advanced technology, and truly become a Pacific power able to leverage its new 
status, in order to, as Chris Horton writes, “demand the closure of U.S. military bases in 
[Japan and South Korea].”324 Maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific is not only vital in 
the case of Taiwan, but for U.S. interests throughout the region and the wellbeing of 
America’s closest allies. China’s naval modernization and development of what is 
becoming a blue-water navy, poses the first true challenge to U.S. Navy control in the 
Western Pacific since the end of the Cold War.325 Ultimately, what has emerged, proposes 
Bill Hayton, is “a battle between American demands for access to the ‘global commons’ 
and China’s search for security. It’s a struggle that will define the future of Asia, and 
possibly beyond.”326 
2. Maritime Challenges 
As Brahma Chellaney contends, U.S. strategic objectives in the region are clear: 
“build a pluralistic, rules-based Indo-Pacific order, free of coercion and with unhindered 
freedoms of navigation and overflight.”327 Maritime forces seeking to uphold the rule of 
law face many of the same day-to-day challenges as their counterparts in the 
Mediterranean, such as piracy, illicit trafficking, violent extremist groups, illegal wildlife 
trade, and unregulated fishing.328 What sets this theater apart, however, and the more 
strategically significant challenges, such as China’s “salami-slicing” and grey zone tactics, 
coupled with Beijing’s A2/AD strategy.  
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Salami-slicing tactics are used by China both in the maritime realm, and along its 
western border disputes with India. Srini Sitaraman describes the tactic from the 
perspective of India, where China begins “gradually occupying contested territory and 
offering a fait accompli to its Indian counterpart, at which point India has to either accept 
the new territorial status-quo or militarily confront a larger and economically well-
resourced country.”329 Considering the maritime realm, argues Sitaraman, it is “[a] 
strategy that China has honed in the South China Sea without significant pushback from 
the ASEAN countries, with the exception of Vietnam.”330 These tactics are coupled, finds 
a RAND study, with “China’s unique brand of gray zone measures,”  massing and using 
maritime militia forces, fishermen, and the Chinese coast guard to swarm vessels and 
“assert administrative control over disputed island features and the maritime zones that 
those features create.”331  
Robert Gold contends that this strategy in the SCS is a means of delegitimizing 
competitors, through lawfare.332 Beijing claims features within its maritime sphere, using 
language of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ultimately placing 
China at odds with many of its neighbors, like Japan and the Philippines.333  China uses 
the features to enhance its own regional maritime security efforts, to the detriment of its 
neighbors, and the U.S. Navy. It has militarized disputed features in the SCS through the 
installation of coastal defense cruise missiles (CDCM), long-range surface-to-air missiles, 
and other military outposts.334 Supporting this notion, Abenheim et al. argue that “China’s 
strategic interests in its own adjoining seas involve territorial disputes and a desire for a 
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strategic buffer in the maritime sphere.”335 Ultimately, as Bharat Karnad describes, the 
militarization of these features is “part of its A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) strategy.”336 
Its strategy is designed to deny and degrade the ability of allied maritime forces to enter 
and operate in a given environment, through the threat of cruise and ballistic missiles such 
as the DF-21D, and long-range bombers and surface combatants equipped with long-range 
anti-ship missiles, such as the YJ-12 or YJ-18.337 
The primary means of countering excessive Chinese claims, both in terms of 
Taiwan and the SCS, is Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS), evidenced by over 
28 challenges across 19 different nations in 2020.338  FONOPS seek to challenge excessive 
claims through presence operations that normalize international law: in particular, 
UNCLOS. A statement seen frequently, in this case from the Department of State’s (DoS) 
Indo-Pacific vision, punctuates this point: “U.S. forces continue to fly, sail, and operate 
wherever international law allows.”339 The United States, Craig Snyder notes, “has so far 
remained neutral with regard to the various sovereignty claims,” simply seeking to uphold 
the rule of law and maintain freedom of navigation throughout the global commons.340 
Additionally, regional naval exercises promoting allied cooperation and interoperability 
are conducted to further U.S. regional leadership, such as the recent trilateral naval exercise 
held in the SCS in October, 2020, between the U.S. Navy, Royal Australian Navy (RAN), 
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and Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF).341 U.S. Navy Task Force 70 reports the 
exercise was designed to enhance the “collective ability to maintain maritime security and 
readiness to respond to any regional contingency,” while contributing to a “shared 
commitment to the security, stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region.”342  
B. ALLIES AND REGIONAL PARTNERS: COOPERATION AND 
CAPABILITIES 
The ensuing subsections will explore the military space programs of U.S. regional 
allies: Japan, Australia, and South Korea. As before, not every facet each country’s space 
program is discussed, only those that have the potential for integration into an allied space 
coalition that favors maritime operations. It is worth noting that compared to their 
European counterparts, the military space programs of U.S. allies in Asia are still 
considered relatively nascent in nature, except for Japan.  
1. Japan 
James Clay Moltz argues in Asia’s Space Race: “Japan has long been the most 
accomplished space power in Asia.”343 This holds true of U.S. Asian allies today, despite 
Japan’s original interpretation of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty as non-military, rather than 
the more prevalent interpretation of non-aggressive.344 In a similar fashion as shortfalls in 
intelligence during the Gulf War spurred on the French military space program, the North 
Korean launch of a Taepodong missile, over Japan in August 1998 highlighted Japan’s 
domestic need for intelligence satellites.345 Jeffrey Richelson notes that the Japanese SDF 
had received warning of the launch from U.S. national technical assets, but “not as 
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promptly as they [Japan] would have liked.”346 This was, Richelson states, “particularly 
galling for a nation as proud of its technical prowess as Japan.”347 This perceived 
intelligence gap lead to the development of Japan’s intelligence-gathering satellites (IGS), 
first launched in 2003, a move that was defended as upholding the Diet’s 1969 resolution 
of peaceful use of outer space due to the “dual-use” nature of the satellites and the entirely 
non-offensive nature of the assets.348 Up until this point, describes Lionel Fatton, 
“Japanese dependence on the United States in this domain [space] has been at least as 
important as in the conventional domains of warfare.”349 
Japan’s non-military space posture changed in 2008 when the Japanese Diet 
approved Japan’s Basic Space Law, establishing the Strategic Headquarters for Space 
Development, centralizing Japanese space policy, and acknowledging, as stated by Robert 
Wilson, “that Japan needed to begin using space for national security purposes.”350 Lionel 
Fatton notes that even with the shift, Japan continues to maintain its non-offensive posture 
in space and is focused on “military-grade intelligence and early-warning satellites,” a 
posture that was expanded, in Japan’s 2013 National Security Strategy (NSS), to include 
MDA, communications, positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) and space situational 
awareness (SSA).351 The 2008 amendment, however, was not the first incident of Japan’s 
space policy shifting towards a more military focus.  
Japan has recognized the changing threats in space, due in part, as Mari Yamaguchi 
highlights, to the fact that “China and Russia are seeking ways to interfere, disable or 
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destroy satellites.”352 As such, under the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force, a new Space 
Operations Squadron was established in May 2020, intended to reach full operational 
capability (FOC) in 2023.353 The unit will be primarily responsible for monitoring 
spacecraft and SSA operations. Domestically, the unit will coordinate with Japan 
Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), but it is also part of an effort to expand 
international cooperation, which, as Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced, will work with 
counterparts in the U.S. Space Command.354 In addition to the new Space Operations 
Squadron, the Ministry of Defense is responsible overall for space capabilities of the 
Japanese SDF, communication satellites and SSA (Space Operations Squadron); the 
Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center is responsible for intelligence satellites; the Cabinet 
Office also manages and operates the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS); and, finally, 
JAXA is the principle civil space agency responsible for coordination with the MOD and 
Cabinet, while leveraging the country’s vast technological base.355 The overall military 
satellite architecture managed across these institutions consists of eight earth-observation 
satellites,356 two communication satellites,357 and four QZSS satellites.358  
In total, Japan has launched 18 IGS satellites since 2003, responding to Kim Jon 
Il’s missile test a few years earlier.359 Currently on-orbit, according to Lionel Fatton, are 
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“four radar IGSs (plus one spare) and three optical IGSs.”360 Recognizing the need for 
reconnaissance satellites, Takuya Wakimoto contends long-term Japanese security needs 
will require “a total of ten IGSs, including four optical, four radar, and two communication 
(for data-relay) satellites,”361 a position which is supported in Japan’s newest Basic Plan 
on Space Policy, released in June 2020.362 
Keeping with its theme of non-offensive use of space, the Japanese Cabinet 
Intelligence Center uses the IGS constellation to collect earth observation data which is 
distributed to the MOD for national security purposes, in addition to other government 
bodies responsible for natural disaster prevention and response.363 The Japanese defense 
space program draws heavily on its strong technological and industrial base, as Mitsubishi 
is the prime contractor for all IGS satellites, produced by Mitsubishi Electric and launched 
by Mitsubishi Heavy industries.364  
IGS Optical 5–7, launched by Mitsubishi H-IIA rockets in 2015, 2018, and 2020, 
are Japan’s third generation optical reconnaissance satellites, with an assessed resolution 
of greater than 40 centimeters (16 in.), based on data from a 2013 prototype mission.365 
The three optical satellites are maintained in LEO, with a nearly circular orbit, ranging 
from 485–511 km in altitude.366 As might be expected, with inclinations between 97.20° 
and 97.50°, the constellation is sun-synchronous, with periods of roughly 95 minutes 
each,367 ensuring high revisit times and near global coverage. Additionally, the Cabinet 
Intelligence Center manages five remote-sensing radar satellites: IGS Radar 3–6 and an 
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un-numbered radar spare.368 The first two, second generation satellites, launched in 2011 
and 2013, were followed by the on-orbit spare in 2015.369 The newer, third generation, 
reconnaissance satellites, IGS Radar 5 and 6, were launched in 2017 and 2018.370 Similar 
to the IGS Optical series, the IGS Radar satellites are also a sun-synchronous LEO 
constellation, with the same range of inclinations and same average period of 95 
minutes.371 The IGS Radar constellation has a reported resolution nearing 1 meter (39.37 
inches).372 Overall, however, compared to allied European systems such as France’s 
Helios satellites, or the German SAR-Lupe system, little information on the IGS system 
has been released to the public.  
Japan’s newest series of satellites, the Kirameki (DSN) satellites, are the first 
purpose-built system strictly for the MOD. The first of the three X-Band satellites, 
launched in 2017, is Kirameki-2, which Anushree Dutta notes “precedes that of the 
Kirameki-1, which [was] undergoing repair after it was damaged during transportation to 
a launch site in French Guiana in South America.”373 In 2018, following repairs, Kirameki-
1 (DSN-1) was launched as a hosted payload onboard the commercial Superbird-8 
satellite.374 Kirameki-3 is expected to be launched in 2022.375 The satellites are 
maintained in geo-stationary orbit376 with a design life of 15 years that,377 Lionel Fatton 
writes, will “reinforce interoperability between the three SDF services” and “project power 
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farther away from Japanese shores.”378 Kirameki-2 is located 92.97° east,379 over the 
Indian Ocean, assessed to be used for anti-piracy operations near Somalia, and UN 
peacekeeping near South Sudan.380 Kirameki-1 is on-orbit east of Japan at 158° east,381 
and Kirameki-3 is expected to take station between the two, over Japanese territory.382 
Wilson writes that “Japan’s defense satellite communications represent an area in 
which the nation has pursued capabilities that are compatible with U.S. systems.”383 He 
specifically cites that the Japanese X-Band satellites could be interoperable with current 
U.S. X-Band systems such as WGS and DSCS.384 Agreeing with Wilson’s assessment, 
Frank Jannuzi contends, “wherever possible, “[Japan’s] indigenous systems will be 
designed to be interoperable with U.S. hardware and software, providing welcome 
redundancy in core mission areas and thereby contributing to the resilience of the alliance’s 
space assets.”385 Japanese cooperation with allies concerning space systems is not new. In 
the 1980s, satellite imagery was purchased from French SPOT satellites and U.S. 
LANDSAT satellites for use by the Japanese Defense Agency,386 and Japan has been 
cooperating with the U.S. on use of the QZSS system to complement the U.S. GPS 
system.387 
QZSS is Japan’s four satellite PNT system that provides regional coverage. It has 
been operating since 2018 at roughly 135° east, which Fatton describes as “key to 
coordinate troop movements” and enable precision strike operations by the Japanese 
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SDF.388 An additional three satellites are expected to be launched by 2023, allowing the 
system to operate independently of U.S. GPS.389 Additionally, Japan has two further non-
military satellites which assist the SDF and present an opportunity for maritime utility and 
integration into an allied space coalition. Geostationary Meteorological Satellites, 
Himawari 8 and 9, are tasked by the Japanese Basic Plan to “[conduct] continuous 
observation,” which is essential for “monitoring typhoons, severe rain fall, and other 
meteorological phenomena.”390 The two satellites fly in close formation, as Himawari-9 
is expected to take over operations for the older Himawari-8.391 The satellites, launched 
in 2014 and 2016, are in GEO, roughly 140.7° east, providing coverage to East Asia and 
the Western Pacific.392 
2. Australia 
Australia presents as a rather interesting case concerning space, especially in the 
military context. A long-time ally of the United States, and the United Kingdom, Australia 
was somewhat slow in recognizing the strategic necessity of a space program, which, as 
Moltz describes, “led to early knowledge and expertise but also some degree of 
complacency.”393 Moltz further states, “Australia has a long history of participation in 
space activities,” such as its beginnings in military space in 1946 with the Anglo-Australian 
Long Range Weapons Establishment, or cooperation with the U.S. military throughout the 
1960s on “Corona, Midas, Rhyolite, and Defense Support Program Satellites.”394 Yet, as 
late as 2003, a government report stated “There is no strategic, economic or social reason 
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for the Australian Government to pursue self-sufficiency in space,” further stating that 
through allied cooperation it “secures access to the benefits of space.”395 
Ultimately, thinking in Canberra would change. In July 2018, Australia established 
the Australian Space Agency,396 which stated its intent to cooperate “with the Department 
of Defence, where civil space activities interact with defence space activities.”397 A few 
years later, in the Australian Department of Defence Annual Report 2019–20, space was 
recognized as its own domain, under the cognizance of the Royal Australian Air Force 
(RAAF), noting that “[t]his role will be critical as Defence transitions from being a space 
‘user’ to being a space ‘contributor’.”398 The following year, May 2021, the Department 
of Defence announced the establishment of “a Space Division headquarters within the 
Royal Australian Air Force in early 2022.”399 Regarding the space division, Air Marshall 
Hupfeld stated “I think we’re probably about three or four years behind where I would 
rather be at the moment, but we’re catching up quickly.”400 Hupfeld’s urgency, and the 
new Space Division, is all part of a plan that the Minister of Defence stated, is designed to 
develop Defence’s first wholly Australian communications constellation, and 
reconnaissance satellite capability by 2035, a plan that the government has pledged $7 
billion (AUS) to achieve.401 Albeit slower than others in recognizing space as a strategic 
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domain, Defence Minister Reynolds argues “Space is truly the new frontier of both global 
competition and cooperation.”402 Based on an interview with Cassandra Steer, the position 
of Defence Minister Reynolds is supported by Belinda Smith when she concludes, “A 
space division in the military will allow Australia to join its allies ‘and temper the greater 
powers away from what’s happening, and back towards strategic restraint’.”403 
In terms of domestic capability, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has no 
satellites of its own. Space News reports “Australia leans heavily on on [sic] the U.S. 
Wideband Global Satcom (WGS) military satellite network for the bulk of its defense 
communications”; however, according to Henry, it does complement the U.S. network with 
commercial and hosted payloads such as “Optus C1 satellite, an ultra-high frequency 
(UHF) hosted payload on Intelsat 22, and capacity from Inmarsat, ViaSat and 
SpeedCast.”404 Hosted payloads, in the case of Intelsat 22, are expected to save Australia 
over $150 million (AUS) based on design life.405 However, throughput is limited to only 
4kbps, despite having purchased the entire UHF payload, roughly 20% of Intelsat 22’s 
payload.406 This led to the Australian DOD funding the U.S. WGS-6 satellite, and signing 
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) sharing agreement in 2007, for services through 
September 2029.407 The agreement, states the ADF’s Chief Information Office Group 
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Looking towards future security needs, the RAAF is experimenting with CubeSats, 
where Air Vice-Marshall Cath Roberts argues: “This innovative home-grown approach has 
been designed to meet Australia’s unique requirements for sovereign space capability.”409 
Wasting no time, the M2 Pathfinder Mission, and M2 Mission, were launched in June 2020, 
and March 2021, respectively.410 The satellites, a combined effort of the RAAF and 
University of New South Wales, are meant to test homegrown technology, such as the mid-
mission re-programmable software defined radio411 for MDA, earth observation, and 
communications, and in the instance of the Pathfinder M2, which Gunter’s Space Page 
reports, “was designed, assembled and tested in just 10 months.”412 In addition to CubeSat 
research, Australia is developing a domestic PNT system that would be of interest to 
maritime forces. Geoscience Australia received $160.9 million (AUS) from the 2018–19 
budget to design SouthPAN, a Satellite-Based Augmentation System (SBAS).413 
Augmenting current GNSS signals, a government report states that SouthPAN will provide 
PNT data “with decimetre accuracy.”414 The system is expected to be operational by 2025, 
providing coverage to Australia and New Zealand, the first SBAS in the southern 
hemisphere.415 
3. South Korea 
Following World War II and the Korean War, South Korea was suffering 
economically, a result of its industrial base falling north of the 38th parallel, rendering the 
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development of space technology—a luxury.416 South Korea would not invest 
significantly in space until 1989, with the establishment of the Korea Aerospace Research 
Institute (KARI).417 According to Stephanie Wan, its mandate was to develop “sounding 
rockets and satellites, with goals to achieve indigenous satellite technology and launch 
capabilities.”418 The catalyst for the military space program would come in 1998, 
following the North’s launch of its Taepodong-1. Moltz argues the event served to 
highlight “the country’s fundamental reliance upon the United States for space-derived 
intelligence on its neighbor.”419 A few years after the launch, military space endeavors 
began in earnest with establishment of the Agency for Defense Development.420 Since 
2005, writes Moltz, the agency operated a facility dedicated to “control the country’s 
military space communications.”421 In 2007, midgrade officers began training at the U.S. 
Air Force’s National Security Space Institute, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Air Force 
formally established their Space Development Branch.422  
Research and development aside, Seoul took its first operational steps in space 
security in 2015, opening the ROK Air Force Space Operations Center, reported by the 
Korea Times as “the first-ever state-run space situation room of the nation.”423 The 
operations center receives space intelligence data from the U.S., a result of a MOU between 
the ROK Air Force and U.S. Strategic Command.424 The first of three steps, the ROK 
ultimately hoped to establish a platoon managing a constellation of surveillance satellites 
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by 2020, and an independent space command to execute space operations by 2040.425 The 
surveillance constellations are still yet to come to fruition, while in July 2020, Kim Hyun-
chong, deputy national security advisor of South Korea stated in a press conference, “the 
South Korean military needs ‘unblinking eyes’ to monitor the Korean peninsula,” 
reiterating its reliance upon imagery from the U.S.426  
To date, the ROK military has two communication satellites at its disposal,427 and 
the reconnaissance satellite project 425, in development.428 Koreasat 5, the ROK’s first 
military satellite, launched in 2006, is a dual-use satellite providing military utility and 
broadband multimedia and television services for the region.429 The satellite, however, 
suffered damage to its solar array drive-mechanism in 2013 and is thought to be disabled 
or to have significantly reduced capacity.430 The subsequent satellite, ANASIS-II, was 
launched in July 2020, courtesy of a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket.431 The French built, Airbus 
Space and Defence satellite is operated by the Agency for Defense and Development, 
providing secure military communications to the Korean Peninsula.432 With little else 
publicly released, a consensus appears to agree that the satellite will be maintained in GEO 
at 115.90° east,433 over China’s eastern seaboard, and is expected to provide coverage to 
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an area of 113 million square km. The ROK’s next generation of satellites, Project 425, led 
by the French Thales Alenia Space, is expected to begin launching in 2023.434 $930 million 
has been pledged to the project, whose objective is to produce five reconnaissance 
satellites: one SAR and four high-resolution electro-optical satellites.435 The ROK has yet 
to meet its objective of obtaining a devoted reconnaissance satellite constellation for its 
armed forces, however, evidence appears to suggest it leverages the Korea Multi-Purpose 
Satellite (Kompsat) constellation, also called Arirang, in the interim.436 
KARI advertises that its satellite imagery from the Kompsat constellation is used 
for a wide range of applications, ranging from marine resource management to national 
security.437 Kompsat-2, 3, and 3A, are assessed to provide South Korea EO capability to 
monitor the Korean Peninsula 24 hours a day, regardless of weather.438 Kompsat-2 was 
launched in July 2006 with a multi-spectral camera capable of producing 1 m panchromatic 
imagery and 4 m multi-spectral images, a spatial resolution that is more than 40 times better 
than Kompsat-1.439 Wade L. Huntley argues that while officially acknowledged as a civil 
satellite, the advanced spatial resolution and dual-use functionality suggests military use in 
the ISR mission, even drawing criticism from North Korea as a spy satellite.440 The newer 
satellites Kompsat-3A, and Kompsat 3, were launched in 2012 and 2015 respectively.441 
Jeff Jeong reports, specifically, the “South Korean military currently operates the Arirang-
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3 multipurpose satellite to acquire geographical information on the Korean Peninsula, 
including North Korea’s missile and nuclear test sites.”442 All three EO satellites are 
operated in LEO, at altitudes of 528 km (Kompsat-3), and 685 km (Kompsat-2/3A).443 
Taking advantage of greater technological development, Kompsat-3 produces 0.7 m 
panchromatic imagery, and 2.8 km multi-spectral imagery.444 Kompsat-3A, with a lower 
orbit, improves upon this further with spatial resolutions of 0.55 m and 2.2 m 
(panchromatic / multi-spectral), with an additional infrared sensor adding an all-weather 
capability with a 5.5 m resolution.445  
In 2013, Korea’s first domestic SAR satellite, Kompsat-5, was launched to its 
operating orbit of 550 km.446 This all-weather SAR satellite produces high (1 m), standard 
(3 m), and wide area (20 m) resolution imagery.447 Kompsat-5 and the three EO satellites 
operate in an inclined sun-synchronous orbit,448 producing consistent imagery (SAR/EO/
IR) for use in precision map production, change detection, Geographical Information 
Systems (GIS), and intelligence applications.449 Whether or not the satellites are devoted 
MILSATs in nature, the quality of imagery produced by South Korea’s Kompsat 
constellation has military and intelligence utility and should be considered for integration 
into a coalition structure. This is not unlike what the U.S.’s own National Reconnaissance 
Office does, acquiring high-quality imagery from commercial sources, through its 
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Commercial Systems Program Office, a venture endeavoring to maximize emerging 
commercial capabilities, and integrate the data with that of national constellations.450 
Two additional non-military systems of interest to maritime forces are the ROK’s 
two meteorological satellites, GEO Kompsat-2A and GEO Kompsat-2B, used for weather 
observation and ocean/environmental observations, respectively,451 and the ROK’s 
domestic SBAS, Korean Augmentation Satellite System (KASS), expected to be 
operational in 2022, with signal coverage over the East Asian region.452 
C. IMPACT ON NAVAL MISSIONS 
This section now turns towards the application and advantages to be gained from 
the integration of allied space systems throughout the Indo-Pacific. The same structure 
from Chapter III is followed, maintaining a focus on maritime operations, specifically in 
terms of the missions of communications, MDA, and METOC. Maritime forces in the 
Western Pacific face a variety of challenges stemming from China’s rise in regional 
influence and proclivity to continue its “salami slicing” strategy and grey zone tactics.  
1. Communications 
As discussed in the previous chapter, greater interoperability, resiliency, and 
improved bandwidth are all possible benefits derived from allied space cooperation. These 
same trends are seen with Asian allies, simply to a lesser magnitude. As China seeks to 
gain advantages through deception and denial of its adversaries’ equipment, in what the 
DIA reports, Beijing plans to be “informatized local wars,”453 the importance of these 
benefits, especially resiliency, expands.  
In terms of “fight tonight” capability, only Japan and South Korea have the 
potential to augment the communications mission. Japan’s two, Kirameki series satellites, 
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located at 92.97° east and 158° east, are positioned such as to provide MILSAT coverage 
from the Indian Ocean eastward, to beyond the Hawaiian Islands. The satellites can 
augment and provide resiliency to U.S. X-Band communications (WGS and DSCS), if not 
integrated into a fully interoperable coalition constellation, ensuring beyond line-of-sight 
communications to maritime forces conducting FONOPS and other maritime security 
initiatives. 
On paper, South Korea has two communications satellites that can contribute to 
maritime operations: Koreasat-5 and ANASIS-II. Operationally, however, it is unlikely that 
both satellites would integrate into an allied network, considering the damage to Koreasat-
5 in 2013. Whatever capacity remains is likely to be wholly allocated domestically for 
South Korean independent operations and strategic autonomy. The newer French-built 
satellite, however, would be a likely candidate to join with allied assets, providing secure 
military communications over both the East and South China Seas.  
Australia does not currently maintain any military communications satellites; 
however, it should be noted that they have already begun partial integration into the U.S. 
SATCOM architecture, fully funding WGS-6, which provides coverage throughout the 
central Pacific,454 and ensures continuity of communications for 3rd Fleet Forces enroute 
to the 7th Fleet AOR. However, looking towards the future and the continued need for 
resiliency of space assets through the “proliferated LEO” concept, Australia’s CubeSat 
research stemming from the M2 Pathfinder and M2 mission has the potential to contribute.  
2. Maritime Domain Awareness 
The DOD argues that “[g]iven the size of the Asian maritime domain, no coastal 
State can provide effective maritime domain awareness on its own.”455 Therefore, allied 
and partner nations are essential to this mission. Only Japan maintains a fleet of dedicated 
military reconnaissance satellites, however, South Korea’s Kompsat constellation could be 
leveraged to some degree. Additionally, like Japan’s QZSS system, both Australia and 
 
454 “WGS F6 (USA 244),” N2YO, accessed July 22, 2021, https://www.n2yo.com//?s=39222. 
455 Department of Defense, The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy: Achieving U.S. National 
Security Objectives in a Changing Environment, 28. 
91 
South Korea have domestic SBAS systems in development: SouthPAN and KASS. These 
systems, while not able to provide uncooperative tracking, will augment the U.S. GPS 
constellation, providing for a clearer common operational picture in terms of blue force 
tracking and commercial vessels, essential tasks while operating in some of the busiest 
waterways in the world. This will generate better situational awareness for commanders 
conducting presence operations, such as the Taiwan Strait Transit conducted by USS Curtis 
Wilbur (DDG-54) in June 2021, the sixth transit under the Biden Administration.456 
Moreover, leveraging the combined reconnaissance capabilities of an allied 
coalition could help build alliance solidarity and deny China unhindered exploitation of 
disputed features in the SCS. Whereas previously, long-range reconnaissance aircraft were 
required, reconnaissance satellites, writes Glenn Schloss, “will enhance transparency and 
contribute to confidence-building among rival nations.”457 Encouraging the sharing of 
reconnaissance data in this manner, through the use Japan’s IGS constellation, and high-
resolution imagery from the ROK’s Kompsat satellites, could help to build trust amongst 
allied nations. Moreover, the ability to persistently monitor China’s activity on disputed 
features will allow for early detection of militarization and potential crisis, which Schloss 
argues will allow decision makers the ability “to seek to defuse tensions through 
diplomacy,” rather than military action.458 These constellations could also be used to 
monitor for the presence of Chinese auxiliary vessels carrying deep submersibles that have 
the potential to threaten the integrity of undersea cables in the SCS. Overall cooperation in 
this nature could help build stability and reduce tensions, benefitting not only the U.S. 
Navy, but that of its allies, partners, and even adversaries operating in and around the SCS.  
Finally, greater coverage and situational awareness generated from allied 
reconnaissance satellites will assist maritime forces facing the challenge of China’s A2/
AD network. Chinese doctrine is very favorable on the use of deception, cyber, and EW 
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attack. Employing this strategy in support of its A2/AD network, the adversary, argues 
Alex Vershinin, will “[engage] from unexpected locations by modern air defenses, 
including long-range surface-to-surface missiles and fixed-wing fighter aircraft.”459 A 
more robust, and defensible reconnaissance architecture spread amongst regional allies, 
will help allied maritime forces to operate effectively under the threat of an A2/AD 
umbrella. Even when challenged in space, the navy will retain its benefit of situational 
awareness, and early warning in movements of missile launchers, aircraft, and even 
construction of new A2/AD assets on disputed features. High resolution sub-meter class 
imagery from South Korea could be critical in detecting changes to both artificial features 
and military infrastructure in the SCS. Assured access and understanding of what is moving 
in and entering the maritime domain will allow the U.S. Navy and its allies to overcome 
the challenges faced in great power competition.  
3. Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations 
The importance of assured METOC data and forecasting for maritime forces 
operating in the Indo-Pacific cannot be understated. Threats to forces are generated not 
simply from hostile interactions, but from nature and weather as well. The prime example 
generates from Admiral Halsey’s loss of hundreds of sailors and three destroyers to a 
typhoon (see Chapter II) in the last major maritime campaign of the World War II theater. 
Moreover, Bob Gough contends that it is “an area prone to natural disasters, particularly 
cyclones and earthquakes,” whereby “military services are often required to distribute aid 
and deliver medical care, as well as to establish communication systems,” a result of 
compromised infrastructure that can delay relief efforts.460 HA/DR remains a vital mission 
for the United States, in terms of preventing suffering and loss of life for hundreds of 
thousands of people, but also as a means of further demonstrating U.S. commitment, 
resolve, and leadership throughout the Indo-Pacific. 
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The military’s legacy Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) is the 
oldest still operational satellite program, yet replacement weather satellites, write Harrison 
and Daniels, “have run into repeated acquisition problems over the past decade.”461 The 
U.S.’s newest weather satellites, the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite 
(GOES) program, while operational, fail to cover the region of the Western Pacific (100°- 
130° east), focusing on the continental U.S., to include Alaska and Hawaii.462 In this 
disaster prone area of operations, this is a mission that allied space cooperation can 
significantly leverage, providing newer, reliable, and redundant meteorological satellites 
to assist forecasting in support of maritime security forces and the HA/DR mission. Both 
Japan and South Korea maintain meteorological satellite systems relevant to this mission.  
The Himawari satellites, operated by the Japan Meteorological Agency, currently 
share data with NOAA;463 however, formal incorporation into an allied space coalition 
would help ensure persistent and assured weather forecasting for maritime forces operating 
in the South and East China Seas. The same is true of South Korea, which operates its 
meteorological satellites, GEO Kompsat-2A and GEO Kompsat-2B. These four satellites 
all provide coverage to the western Pacific, ranging from Kompsat-2B at 128.00°, to 
Himawari-9 positioned more eastward at 140.7°. Allied meteorological satellites are better 
positioned than their U.S. counterparts, providing variability that, Camacho-Lara et al. 
write, is “a very useful redundancy of coverage that is particularly important in tracking 
major storms and obtaining the most up-to-date information of atmospheric, oceanic, and 
of arctic conditions.”464 
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D. ALLIANCE STRUCTURE COMPARISON 
This final section compares the three proposed alliance structures in the context of 
Japan, Australia, and South Korea. As the space programs and architectures of Asia are 
themselves less robust than in Europe, the section will primarily account for the countries’ 
individual space policies, doctrine, and histories to better understand how they might 
influence the structure of an allied space coalition throughout the region. The section closes 
with discussion of the actual impact of Asian space systems on the different coalition 
structures. In parallel to the thinking of Chapter III, specific policy recommendations and 
conclusions drawn from the discussion are withheld for analysis in the concluding chapter.  
When addressing the subject of coalition building and increased cooperation in the 
Indo-Pacific, it is important to remember the regional history and its traditional alliance 
structure. In a 2021 statement before a House subcommittee concerning Asian affairs, 
Richard N. Haass addressed this exact issue concerning regional alliances: “While 
Washington will always be the hub of its alliance system, the spokes should be encouraged 
to do more with each other. An important piece of this effort will be to repair relations 
between Seoul and Tokyo.”465 In short, Indo-Pacific alliances have long been bilateral in 
nature, with relationships amongst allies rather tense, stemming from decades old tension 
and mistrust between South Korea and Japan, or even the result of Imperial Japanese forces 
bombing Darwin, Australia, during WWII.466 
The status quo for security alliances in the Indo-Pacific is a Cold War concept, the 
hub-and-spokes alliance system (bilateral), with limited cross-spoke cooperation.467 In 
terms of establishing an allied space coalition involving Indo-Pacific allies, this will 
certainly be the simplest method of building cooperation, especially given the mistrust 
amongst the U.S.’s allies. This approach appears favorable given evidence outlined in 
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section B. Asian allies’ space systems are more domestically derived, with little to no 
international cooperation, in sharp contrast to the space programs of Europe.  
Drawing upon Michael Horowitz’s Adoption-Capacity Theory, whereby 
innovations requiring a lower threshold of organizational capital and financial intensity are 
more readily adopted, the case for bilateral cooperation appears to fit the bill.468 By 
carrying over the status quo of alliances into the space domain, existing alliances will 
simply expand more formally into space. Little to no adoption of a new concept is required 
(organizational capital), and the financial burden should remain minimal, as existing 
structures and features of security coordination with the U.S. will be maintained without a 
need for significant change. However, while arguably the status quo to date, this structure 
has already begun trending towards more expansive cooperation. Simón et al., observe a 
shift in regional policies, seemingly overcoming past barriers to cooperation, which they 
proclaim is driven by fear of North Korea’s “nuclear and missile threat” and China’s 
rise.469 The evidence, they argue, is observed in the “trilateral defence cooperation” 
between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, “the U.S.-Japan-Australia trilaterals as well as 
the so-called ‘Quad’ between Washington, Tokyo, Canberra and Delhi.” 470 
Simón et al. also found that while U.S. allies in East Asia still frame their security 
initiatives around localized threats, China’s rise “has gradually become a region-wide 
threat” that “has catalysed greater defence cooperation among previously disconnected 
allies and partners.”471 Overcoming a lack of trust and even open hostility amongst allied 
nations will be the largest hurdle in truly developing a regional space coalition. 
Additionally, trust, or lack thereof, concerning the United States and its sharing of 
intelligence, has previously shown to be a factor in the development of domestic space 
programs in both Japan and South Korea. Furthermore, South Korea greatly desires its own 
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military satellite architecture, yet remains reluctant, and as Jung Hun Jang writes, fearful 
“that launching independent military reconnaissance satellites is expensive and could harm the 
ROK–US alliance.”472  
Chung Min Lee acknowledges the ROK-U.S. bilateral relationship has been strained 
over the previous four years, yet writes that it has improved under the Biden administration, 
such that “there could be closer alignment between Seoul and Washington on Indo-Pacific 
security issues,” whereby “there may be more willingness on South Korea’s part to engage 
with U.S. policy toward the region.”473 However, Lee does note that “South Korea is likely to 
be much more cautious than other U.S. allies such as Japan and Australia,”474 even 
highlighting early on that South Korea is uniquely positioned amongst U.S. allies, as it “is the 
only country that has maintained historical ties with China for more than a thousand 
years.”475 In short, South Korea appears open to the idea of expanded regional cooperation, 
albeit not necessarily to the extent of Australia or Japan. However, it is important to note 
that Seoul’s willingness to expand cooperation may be tempered by historical tensions with 
Japan. Relations between Seoul and Tokyo have even just recently deteriorated. Park 
Byong-su, reporting on South Korea’s 2020 defence white paper, observes that Japan was 
downgraded from a partner, and is now listed as a “neighboring country with whom we 
need to collaborate.”476 Similarly, South Korea’s role in security cooperation, was 
downgraded in Japan’s own 2020 defence white paper.477 Yet, Da Zhigang points out, 
“South Korea feels that it cannot ‘downgrade’ its ties with Japan to a level that the U.S. 
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does not want to see,” and still acknowledges it must cooperate with Japan in regional 
security efforts.478 
Alternatively, Australia and Japan are perceived to look favorably upon a regional 
space coalition, despite some mistrust stemming from Japan’s hostile actions of WWII. In 
its 2020 Defence Strategic Update, Australia states it “will continue to work to strengthen 
defence and diplomatic ties with the countries in Australia’s immediate region, working 
alongside important partners such as the United States, Japan and New Zealand.”479 
Similarly, Japan had stated its position, in an outline of its 2020 Basic Plan on Space Policy 
as intending to achieve “economic prosperity and ensuring peace and stability in 
cooperation with the ally and partners [sic].”480 Both countries maintain the importance of 
cooperation with the U.S. and allies, yet a theme similar to that of Europe has emerged—
strategic independence in space. Japan announced its goal “to become a self-sustained 
space faring nation,” while still “strategically collaborating with its ally and partners.”481 
Australia too, advocates the importance of its “sovereign space infrastructure.”482 This 
desire to maintain strategic independence in space will need to be accounted for when 
building an allied space coalition. However, allies may recognize a benefit to 
interdependence as a means of reducing their individual financial burdens. 
The rise of China has certainly served as a catalyst, encouraging greater regional 
security efforts, a position which is accounted for in the military and space policies of the 
three nations. However, mention of expanded or global space cooperation is also supported, 
simply appearing as a lower priority given the localized threat of China. In 2017, Japan 
addressed the impact of satellites on MDA in its space policy and announced it “will 
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continuously strengthen collaboration with the U.S., France and other countries,” even 
further stating a desire to contribute to an “international earth observation network.”483 As 
noted in section B, Japan has collaborated with France since the 1980s, further supporting 
its willingness to enter a more expansive coalition. 
As a member of Five-Eyes, Australia appears to have the most favorable posture 
towards global cooperation. However, formal Australian space policy to support this 
position is non-existent, such that Malcom Davis argues, “Australia lacks a definitive 
declaratory defence space strategy or policy.”484 But, their actions in space activity paint 
a clearer picture. As of 2018, Australia was a member of the U.S.-led Combined Space 
Operations Center (CSpoC) and Operation Olympic Defender, alongside the UK, Canada, 
and New Zealand.485 Yet, despite the advantages of this cooperation, Davis would appear 
to urge caution. He suggests that as a middle power, Australia must be wary of the 
counterspace threats faced from China, and tread cautiously in the “intensifying China-US 
military-strategic competition.”486 South Korea, by comparison, is similar in the fact that 
its space policy is sparse at best, providing no formal policy on their position. The U.S. 
would certainly welcome Seoul into a global coalition, evidenced by Cohen’s 
characterization stating, “he [Colonel Scott Brodeur] expects new partnerships with 
countries like Japan, Italy, and ‘maybe even South Korea,’ in the near future.”487 In a June 
6, 2021 speech, South Korean President Moon Jae-in, announced “We will expand space-
related cooperation with the international community, including the United States, and 
 
483 National Space Policy Secretariat, Implementation Plan of the Basic Plan on Space Policy 
(Revised FY2017), 48,102. 
484 Malcolm Davis, The Australian Defence Force and Contested Space (Barton, Australia: The 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2019), 30. 
485 Rachel S. Cohen, “Building the New Space Coalition,” Air Force Magazine (blog), March 26, 
2021, https://www.airforcemag.com/article/building-the-new-space-coalition/. 
486 Davis, The Australian Defence Force and Contested Space, 37. 




usher in a new space era for the Republic of Korea.”488 Without any formal military space 
policy to refute or confirm the statement, Seoul can be assessed, at a minimum, open to the 
possibility of space cooperation beyond simply the Indo-Pacific. 
In terms of strict military utility, the variability across the proposed alliance 
structures for the Indo-Pacific is more nuanced than in Europe. Japan clearly stands out 
amongst the U.S.’s Asian allies, as far as overt military space assets are concerned. 
However, engaging in simple bilateral agreements rather than a broader regional alignment 
might be a mistake. Certainly, a bilateral structure is simplest and would provide the U.S. 
access to the military space assets of Japan, but it could be short sighted. Regional and 
global coalition structures might present a more favorable option from an operational 
perspective. Cooperation and coordination now could help bolster nascent military space 
programs allowing for greater collective deterrence and military utility in the long term.  
The ROK’s Kompsat constellation could be leveraged in a regional coalition, 
despite a lack of trust amongst U.S. regional allies. Its unclassified imagery could be used 
to overcome lack of trust in the region, which hinders the sharing of more protected data 
from military satellite systems, and even be used to even build trust. Writing about 
Afghanistan and Iraq, George Seffers notes that satellite imagery used to support operations 
is typically “only available at the secret level and above. Very few partners have access to 
this classified data, and this limitation hinders collaboration…”489 Seffers reports that 
commercial unclassified sources were used to fill these gaps, allowing for easier open 
sharing.490 The ROK’s Kompsat constellation could be used in this sense, allowing for 
cooperation amongst allies that may not yet have the trust to cooperate spoke-to-spoke, 
generating a more robust coalition and not sticking to a Cold War era structure.  
A global coalition structure might provide even greater collective deterrence than 
that of a regional one. Moreover, the growing military space programs in Asia would be 
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strengthened by access to resources, experience, and satellite assets, not just from the 
United States but from those of Germany, France, and the UK. From a U.S. perspective, 
further development of the military space programs in Asia is favorable. In the context of 
global great power competition, development of these military space programs will only 
serve to add a greater diversity of assets, geographical dispersion, and capability to a 
coalition. For operational maritime forces, this will mean a higher probability of 
maintaining assured access to—communications, MDA data, weather forecasting, and 
weapons system modeling—essential to operating in a Chinese A2/AD environment.  
Having concluded the second of two regional case studies, addressing China’s rise 
to power and subsequent impact on the Indo-Pacific, the following chapter draws upon 
both the European and Asian perspective to present comprehensive findings and outline 
policy recommendations. Without being redundant, Chapter V draws conclusions based on 
evidence derived from the case studies and presents a case for the optimal coalition 
structure, given the history, capabilities, and regional geopolitics observed in France, 
Germany, and Great Britain in Europe; and Japan Australia, and South Korea, in the Indo-
Pacific. 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In an era of renewed great power competition, the U.S. finds itself challenged by 
Russia and China. In this context, the U.S. seeks to leverage allies as force multipliers and 
means of overcoming emerging challenges. In the maritime realm, the United States Navy 
is the forward presence of the U.S., facing these challenges as they emerge in the regions 
near these allies. This thesis has studied how allied space cooperation might enhance naval 
operations and examined possible alternative structures for a U.S.-led space coalition to 
improve maritime operations. Two case studies were conducted evaluating current U.S. 
allies, their space capabilities, policies, and histories. The European case study examined 
Germany, France, and the UK, and their possible contributions to maritime forces facing 
challenges from Russia in the Mediterranean and Arctic. In the Asian case study, Japan, 
Australia, and South Korea were evaluated relative to the operational challenges in the 
South China Sea and a Taiwan contingency, resulting from the rise of China.  
A. CASE STUDIES 
This section briefly summarizes the key findings and notable takeaways from each 
of the two regional case studies and informs the policy recommendations outlined in 
section B.  
1. Europe 
When examining alliance structures in Europe, an emerging trend is observed. 
Institutionalized multinational alliances are beginning to fragment in a shift towards 
multitudes of bilateral agreements. The fragmentation was a result of increased political 
differences, variation in threat perception, and rising European nationalism felt throughout 
the European nations, as well as a broader concern that NATO had experienced a loss of 
purpose after the fall of the Soviet Union.  
From an operational perspective of the U.S. navy, aligning its efforts with the 
fragmentation in Europe would not appear to generate any loss in capability; however, this 
approach will weaken the individual European allies as they would lose cross-coalition 
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benefits, and the curated bilateral alliances will see a greatly reduced collective deterrence 
capability concerning the individual space architectures. Furthermore, the space programs 
and policies of the U.S.’s European allies are interconnected financially and operationally, 
both between the nations and institutions, as was seen in France’s Helios program and the 
NATO SATCOM Post-2000 program, described in Chapter III.  
At a minimum, efforts at building a space coalition with the U.S.’s European allies 
should seek a regional structure. Disentangling the interdependent space programs of 
Europe will be not only challenging, but downright detrimental and destabilizing to the 
region. European interdependence in space is a benefit for the U.S. and should be 
encouraged, further leveraging burden sharing and building alliance solidarity. Moreover, 
both French and British space policies expressed a global outlook and possible desire for 
expanded cooperation beyond the minimum recommended regional space coalition. In the 
European case study, only German space policy provides any evidence to suggest a 
possible desire for restraint when considering a global space coalition. Yet, German space 
policy is very utilitarian in nature, seeking “avoidance of duplicate activities and 
structures.”491 It can be presumed that as a utilitarian measure, Germany will support a 
global space alliance for the purpose of leveraging greater collective deterrence, increased 
burden sharing, and a significant reduction in redundant systems. Additionally, in a 
European nationalist environment, if France, a European leader and preeminent space 
power, agreed to a global space coalition, Germany might too be persuaded. Ultimately, 
considering the U.S.’s European allies, a U.S. led space coalition should at a minimum be 
regional in nature, yet strive for the benefits of the expanded global space coalition.  
2. Asia 
In Asia, U.S. allies are entrenched in bilateral alliance structures, the result of Cold-
War era alliance building and historical tensions between the nations themselves. Japan’s 
imperialist history of the late 19th and early 20th centuries is responsible for significant 
tensions between Seoul and Tokyo, and to some extent Canberra. However, fear of China’s 
 
491 Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, Making Germany´s Space Sector Fit for the 
Future: The Space Strategy of the German Federal Government, 29. 
103 
rise and the nuclear threat from an unstable North Korean regime are believed to have 
facilitated greater cooperation amongst the three U.S. allies, seeking to overcome the 
greater regional threats, as described in the alliance structure comparison in Chapter IV.  
Operationally, as in Europe, the difference between a bilateral approach versus 
regional or global cooperation will be unsubstantial, as the U.S. will gain the benefit of 
access to each countries’ satellite architecture, regardless of the chosen alliance structure. 
A bilateral approach, however, is short sighted. It will fail to generate any significant 
collective deterrence in Asia, nor will it generate any benefit of burden sharing. As the 
majority stakeholder of space assets in bilateral agreements, the U.S. will ultimately bear 
the burden of providing satellite coverage, when needed, to each country, rather than share 
the burden across assets of regional neighbors. Furthermore, apart from Japan, the space 
programs of the countries reviewed in the second case study are newly formed, and while 
Japan has a developed program, its military space capabilities are barely a decade old. 
Maintaining bilateral cooperation in Asia will prevent the U.S.’s allies from having both 
the stability derived from collective deterrence and the benefits that greater cooperation 
and coordination will have on the developing military space programs.  
Given the historical tensions within Asia, a global approach to a space coalition, 
may be even more readily accepted amongst the allies, rather than a regional coalition 
structure. The addition of Germany, France, and the UK to the alliance structure can help 
to pacify tensions and assist in building trust. For example, South Korea can leverage 
resources and space-based intelligence from its European allies in a global coalition, rather 
than directly relying upon its more tenuous relationship with Japan. However, while 
receiving direct support from Europe, South Korea can still passively cooperate with Japan 
in terms of collective deterrence and can over time rebuild ties between Seoul and Tokyo, 
slowly overcoming the lack of trust. Ultimately, for the U.S. and its allies, greater 
cooperation throughout the Indo-Pacific will bolster allied space programs and generate 
greater long-term benefits.  
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B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
As Russia and China both operate trans regionally, so too should the United States. 
Facing these trans regional threats and nations with proven counterspace capabilities, the 
U.S. should seek a global space coalition which is most favorable for enhancing U.S. naval 
operations, especially considering the long-term strategic implications of great power 
competition. This coalition structure will leverage the combined space assets of global 
allies, providing the greatest benefit in terms of collective deterrence and burden sharing, 
allowing for faster development of nascent military space programs through access to a 
broader pool of resources and experience. This approach will ensure mission assurance of 
communications, MDA data, and METOC support to U.S. and allied naval forces. Forward 
deployed ships will have improved access to bandwidth and greater throughput enabling 
network centric warfare. Allied SAR and EO reconnaissance satellites will increase 
mission assurance, ensure global coverage, and shorten revisit times, providing enhanced 
MDA and pattern of life for Russian submarines getting underway or Chinese warships in 
the SCS. Regional weather satellites will ensure timely and accurate weather forecasting 
and sensor performance modeling, reducing the risk of weather damage, ensuring sensor 
performance, and assisting in HA/DR response planning. 
According to Kelly McCoy, the strategic environment today has become 
“transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional,” leading him to the conclusion that 
geographic COCOMs fail to retain their relevance for present and future security needs.492 
Space coalitions can be viewed in parallel to this argument. The challenges faced in space 
and even satellites themselves are inherently global and multi-domain in nature. If there is 
a question of whether geographically delineated COCOMs remain relevant, it should be no 
stretch to make the case in space, an even more geographically diverse domain, that 
limiting alliances to a Cold War era force structure will be folly. 
To best leverage a global space coalition, three additional policies are 
recommended for integration into the coalition framework. First, allies in both Europe and 
 
492 Kelly McCoy, “The World the Combatant Command Was Designed for Is Gone,” War on the 
Rocks (blog), October 7, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/10/the-world-the-combatant-command-
was-designed-for-is-gone/. 
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Asia should be encouraged to design their future military space architectures in a manner 
consistent with the United States Space Force Vision for Satellite Communications 
(SATCOM)493 and the U.S. Navy’s Project Overmatch. This means developing systems 
able to operate and integrate into an enterprise architecture, rather than legacy stovepipe 
architectures. Specifically in the maritime domain, Project Overmatch is the Navy’s 
initiative to develop a joint naval operational architecture, capable of enabling a common 
communication capability across domains and services in support of the Joint All-Domain 
Command and Control (JADC2) construct.494 Furthermore, a challenge to the global 
coalition structure will be a useable sharing mechanism for data amongst the allies. A 
coalition cloud-based infrastructure, like the Navy’s Project Overmatch, could bridge this 
gap. Hosting servers amongst allied participants will provide resilience through global 
geographical dispersion and collective buy in from allies.  
Second, the USN and DOD at large should not only seek to cooperate with allies in 
satellite capability, but should leverage the unique geographies and launch capabilities of 
its allies. In a conflict emerging from great power competition, the U.S. will now face peer 
adversaries capable of threatening domestic launch sites. Launch sites such as the ESA’s 
spaceport in Kourou, French Guinea, or future launch sites in Australia provide 
advantageous equatorial launch sites and would generate resiliency for a global space 
coalition, providing the means for assured access to space launch capabilities. Furthermore, 
the U.S. should leverage the alternate orbital launch vehicles of its allies, such as the French 
Ariane rockets, Korean Space Launch Vehicle (KSLV), or Japan’s H-II rockets. This will 
allow for diversity in not only launch geography but resiliency of launch platform.  
A third and final recommendation is to promote not only integration within the 
coalition but interdependence to capitalize on burden sharing. The German utilitarian 
mindset should be embraced. As discussed in both Chapters III and IV, nations will likely 
 
493 United States Space Force, United States Space Force Vision for Satellite Communications 
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seek to maintain some degree of strategic independence in space, but full strategic 
independence remains cost prohibitive for most nations. Recognition of this reality will 
allow allies and the U.S. to allocate resources more efficiently. Interdependence and burden 
sharing will allow individual allies to leverage coalition assets that on their own would be 
cost prohibitive to develop domestically, while allocating limited resources to their nation’s 
specific technological bases. For example, Japan and Australia would be well suited to 
continued development of CubeSats and CubeSat launchers, while Germany could focus 
its efforts on its highly regarded SAR satellite reconnaissance program.  
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The case study approach of this thesis was used to analyze and assess the best 
overall structure for allied space cooperation with existing U.S. allies, ultimately 
determining a global coalition structure to be most beneficial. The specifics of the structure, 
however, were outside the scope of this work. Therein lies an opportunity for further 
research to determine a specific framework and parameters for establishing a global space 
coalition structure. General guiding principles and policies are proposed in section B, but 
these policies should be expanded upon. What are the challenges or feasibilities of 
managing a cloud-based infrastructure to support the magnitude of a global space 
coalition? Additionally, the issue of burden sharing and the benefits of interdependence 
within space coalitions appear to be accepted from a surface level analysis. However, 
further research into a cost-benefit analysis and the opportunity costs associated with 
seeking true strategic independence in space, rather than relying upon allies, would be of 
merit to future discussions on space cooperation. 
The difference between a treaty ally compared to a strategic partner is discussed in 
the second chapter of this thesis. Six formal treaty allies are addressed throughout this 
work. However, in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, other nations like Italy, Spain, 
Taiwan, India, and Saudi Arabia have space capabilities that might be considered by the 
U.S. for inclusion in joint space efforts. These opportunities should be viewed in line with 
the Space Force’s three Lines of Effort (LOE) outlined in its 2021 campaign support plan. 
These LOEs seek to expand the U.S.’s allied and partner relationships, while strengthening 
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and leveraging nascent allied and partner opportunities to ensure that in the space domain, 
the U.S. is the—partner of choice.495 The plan specifically calls for exploring relationships 
with “countries who may not project power globally or unilaterally, provide niche 
capabilities/access, or may deliberately disrupt a strategic competitor’s strategy.”496  
India for example, is certainly a country which could disrupt the PRC’s regional 
strategies. Chapter IV highlighted the importance of the Indo-Pacific to the United States, 
its designation as the priority theater, and the resulting challenges from China’s rise. While 
not an ally, India is a major player in the Indo-Pacific, both as a regional power and a 
proven space power. In the maritime domain, the USN has increased its bilateral 
cooperation with India over the last decade. This increased maritime cooperation begs the 
question of when and if the U.S. will begin to cooperate with India in military space 
endeavors, beyond the sharing of SSA data. Admittedly, however, this is likely to be 
complicated by current laws like the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions 
Act (CAATSA).497 
Finally, what opportunities exist for a U.S.-led global space coalition to assist 
emerging space programs, through technical expertise or technology transfer, in a similar 
fashion as institutional investors provide seed money to startup companies? Is there a long-
term strategic benefit to allowing membership of nations which may not be able to 
contribute at the moment, but could allow access for ground control locations or launch 
sites?  This is not to imply that this policy is the best way forward, or even a feasible policy 
option. It is simply meant to address the fact that space activity is no longer constrained to 
the major global actors. While this thesis addresses the role of U.S. allies and their possible 
contributions to various space coalition structures, little if any research is available 
addressing U.S. strategic partners and other emerging space actors. This research will likely 
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require investigation into data sharing agreements, classification issues, and International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).  
D. CONCLUSION 
Over the next decade, maritime and space strategy of the U.S. will build upon 
doctrines such as the Tri-Service Maritime Strategy and the United States Space Force 
Vision for Satellite Communications (SATCOM), seeking to increase allied cooperation, 
expand deterrence and leverage the pooling of resources. The chapters in this work tackled 
the issue of how best to approach allied space cooperation to enhance USN operations in 
great power competition with Russia and China. Each of the U.S.’s allies bring different 
capabilities and limitations to the table concerning an allied space coalition. However, in 
the three missions addressed (communications, MDA, and METOC), each of the six allies 
have the capability to augment or have already begun augmenting at least one of the three 
mission areas currently serviced primarily by the U.S.’s domestic space capability. By 
examining six of the U.S.’s strongest allies in space, three in each major region of 
competition, this thesis finds a global space coalition to be the greatest advantage for the 
USN and entire U.S. military to gain a strategic advantage over its peer competitors. A 
global space coalition structure will generate the greatest counterspace deterrence, reduce 
resource costs, and produce the force multiplier the military needs, while helping to 
strengthen the military space programs of all participants.  
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